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I. INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides the primary foundation for the protection of several individual
rights, including free speech and religious autonomy.' At times, how-
L. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
1939
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ever, efforts to protect these rights appear to conflict with competing
restraints on state action.2 The drafters of the First Amendment's
Religion Clauses,3 for example, sought to guarantee religious freedom
while maintaining a separation between church and state.4 The goal
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for redress of grievances." U.S. Const., Amend. I.
2. Legislative attempts to satisfy the mandates of the Free Exercise Clause may be
viewed as preferring religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. See, for example,
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 414-15 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring) (concluding that
congressional measures to immunize certain religious groups from general regulation may
violate restraints on state action); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710-11 (1985)
(holding that state law that prohibits dismissal of Sabbath observers for refusal to work on their
chosen Sabbath constitutes impermissible establishment of religion); Board of Educ. of Westside
Community Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 263-64 (1990) (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting the
inherent tension that exists between a committment to religious autonomy and the goal of state
neutrality towards religion); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 296 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (stating "[t]here are certain practices, conceivably violative of the
Establishment Clause, the striking down of which might seriously interfere with certain
religious liberties also protected by the First Amendment ') (footnote omitted). See generally
Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1961);
Paul Marcus, The Forum of Conscience: Applying Standards Under the Free Exercise Clause,
1973 Duke L. J. 1217; Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 Cal. L.
Rev. 753 (1984); Walter F. Murphy, James E. Fleming, and William F. Harris II, American
Constitutional Interpretation 1004-05 (Foundation, 1986).
Despite these concerns, it is possible to read the two Religion Clauses as serving the same
ultimate goal, protecting the individual's freedom of religious belief and practice. The Free
Exercise Clause forbids encroachment into religious freedom through the imposition of penal-
ties, while the Establishment Clause prohibits "inhibitions on individual choice that arise from
governmental aid to religion." Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 1501 (Foundation, 12th ed.
1991). Commentators have suggested that the absence of conflict between the two clauses must
be presumed, and that the actual debate is not over what to do when one clause requires what
the other forbids. Rather, the proper inquiry focuses on interpreting the two clauses so as to
render their mandates compatible. See generally Michael W. McConnell, Accomodation of
Religion, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1; Gary J. Simson, The Establishment Clause in the Supreme Court:
Rethinking the Court's Approach, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 905 (1987).
The Supreme Court has recognized, at least in theory, the compatible nature of the Free
Exercise and Establishment clauses. See, for example, Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2665
(1992) (stating "[the First Amendment encompasses two distinct guarantees... both with the
common purpose of securing religious liberty") (footnote omitted); Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 40 (1947) (Rutlegde, J., dissenting) (recognizing that '"[e]stablshment' and 'free
exercise' were correlative and coextensive ideas, representing only different facets of the single
great and fundamental freedom").
3. The First Amendment contains two references to religion: the Establishment Clause
(prohibiting laws "respecting an establishment of religion), and the Free Exercise Clause
(forbidding laws "prohibiting the free exercise thereof'). U.S. Const., Amend. I. The absolute
language of each suggests an inherent conflict between the two clauses. Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970) (holding that "the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in
absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with
the other'). Some commentators have suggested that the Religion Clauses are, in fact,
internally contradictory. See Suzanna Sherry, Lee v. Weisman: Paradox Redux, 1992 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 123, 124 (stating that a broad interpretation of both clauses makes it impossible to read
them as entirely consistent).
4. Perhaps the best decription of the Framers' desire to separate the government from
the realm of organized religion was articulated by the Court in Everson v. Board of Education,
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of separation becomes very problematic in the context of public
schools, however, where education, state action, and individual rights
combine.5
Throughout its history, the United States Supreme Court has
utilized a variety of tests to determine when a particular government
action violates the Establishment Clause.6  In Lemon v.
330 U.S. 1 (1947). As Justice Black noted, the established pattern of religious organizations
exercising political supremacy
became so commonplace as to shock the freedom-loving colonials into a feeling of
abhorrence. The imposition of taxes to pay ministers' salaries and to build and maintain
churches and church property aroused their indignation. It was these feelings which
found expression in the First Amendment .... [James Madison argued that] a true
religion did not need the support of law;.., that the best interest of a society required
that the minds of men always be wholly free; and that cruel persecutions were the
inevitable result of government-established religions.
Id. at 11-12 (footnotes omitted). This idea likewise was acknowldedged by the Court in West
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). In Barnette, Justice Jackson
emphasized that the merger of church and state "invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which
it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control."
Id. at 642. See also Schempp, 374 U.S. at 295 (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting the dangers that
exist in the interaction of church and state "which the Framers feared would subvert religious
liberty and the strength of a system of secular government"). It is from this basic
understanding of the conflict inherent in church-state interaction that the Supreme Court has
attempted to fashion a coherent and consistent Establishment Clause doctrine.
See also Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 14-3 at 1160 (Foundation, 2d ed.
1988) (stating that the Establishment Clause "assumels] that the advancement of a church
would come only from the voluntary support of its followers and not from the political support of
the state").
5. The Court repeatedly has addressed the issue of organized religion in public schools in
an attempt to achieve the appropriate balance between principles of free speech and religious
autonomy and Establishment Clause concerns. At the same time, however, the Court also has
recognized the unique risks that religion presents in the context of state-financed education.
See Betsy Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship: The Conflict Between Authority and
Individual Rights in the Public School, 95 Yale L. J. 1647, 1655-67 (1986); David de Andrade,
Note, The Equal Access Act: The Establishment Clause v. The Free Exercise and Free Speech
Clauses, 33 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 447, 462-67 (1988). See also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229
(1977); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263
(1981); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); note 16 and accompanying text.
6. This Recent Development focuses on the Supreme Court's unquestionable failure to
delineate and consistently apply any single Establishment Clause test. What can hardly be
labeled Establishment Clause jurisprudence reflects more the Court's preference for elastic
case-by-case adjudication and ends-based reasoning rather than a coherent standard by which
to evaluate church-state interaction.
Early Supreme Court cases suggested an absolute barrier between church and state, relying
primarily on Thomas Jefferson's "wall of separation" metaphor as a means of delineating the
constitutional relationship between government and religion. See, for example, Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 145, 164 (1879) (justifying the wall of separation because
"religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God"); McCollum v. Board of Educ.,
333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) (stating that "[sleparation means separation, not something less");
Everson, 330 U.S. at 18 (recognizing that "[tihe First Amendment has erected a wall between
church and state.., that must be kept high and impregnable"); Engel, 370 U.S. at 425 (1962)
(recognizing that "it is no part of the business of government" to become involved in religious
affairs). The famous "wall of separation" language comes from Thomas Jefferson's
correspondence with the Danbury Baptist Association, in which he stated: "I contemplate with
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Kurtzman,7 the Court established a three-prong inquiry to determine
when the Establishment Clause requires a separation of church and
state.8 Even under the Lemon framework, however, the Supreme
Court has declined to limit itself to a single test,9 or even a primary
guideline, 0 in deciding church-state issues. The members of the
Court often have expressed dissatisfaction with the Lemon test," and
frequently have reformulated it to resemble something less than the
sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that the legislature
should 'make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between church and state." Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to a Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802), in Merrill D.
Peterson, ed., Thomas Jefferson: Writings 510 (Viking, 1984). Later cases tempered the
absolute "wall of separation" rhetoric and focused instead upon the role which religion tradi-
tionally had played in American culture. See, for example, Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,
313-14 (1952); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674-78 (1984); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492
U.S. 573, 620 (1989). In still other cases, the Court has applied a strict historical or case-by-case
approach without really articulating a cohesive test. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786-
92 (1983); Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 667-72 (1970).
7. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
8. In order to pass constitutional scrutiny under the Lemon test, governmental practices
must: (1) have been adopted with a secular purpose; (2) have the principal or primary effect of
neither advancing nor inhibiting religion; and (3) not result in excessive government entangle-
ment with religion. Id. at 612-13. See notes 109-39 and accompanying text.
9. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) (displaying the Court's "unwillingness
to be confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area).
10. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983) (declaring the Lemon tri-part test "no
more than [a] helpful signpost' in dealing with Establishment Clause challenges"); Committee
for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 789-90 (1973) (holding that "constitutional analysis is
not a 'legalistic minuet in which precise rules and forms must govern').
11. See, for example, County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 655 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (noting the impropriety of "advocating, let alone
adopting, [the Lemon] test"); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-40 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (advocating elimination of the purpose prong of the test); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S.
402, 426-31 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (questioning the propriety of the entanglement
prong); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108-12 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (concluding that
the test lacks historical basis in the First Amendment); Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works of
Maryland, 426 U.S. 736, 768-69 (1976) (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (reasoning that
the entanglement prong is unnecessarily confusing in its application). Several commentators
also have questioned the viability of the Lemon test. See, for example, Philip B. Kurland, The
Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Supreme
Court, 24 Vill. L. Rev. 3, 17-23 (1978); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a
Crossroads, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 115, 127-34 (1992); Douglas Laycock, A Survey of Religious
Liberty in the United States, 47 Ohio St. L. J. 409, 450 (1986) (asserting that "[the three-part
test has been so elastic in its application that it means everything and nothing).
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original inquiry.12 The ultimate result has been a confusing and
unstable body of Establishment Clause analysis. 13
In Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District,14 the Supreme Court unanimously struck down a complete
prohibition against the after-hours use of public schools by religious
groups. 5 The Lamb's Chapel decision represents a continuing trend
by the Supreme Court to reduce the force and effect of the
Establishment Clause by weakening considerably the previously strict
limitations placed on the presence and role of organized religion in
public schools.16
In Lamb's Chapel, the Court was presented with a unique
opportunity to clarify the existing constitutional models of church-
state interaction and free speech. Rather than seize this opportunity,
12. See, for example, Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (framing
Establishment Clause inquiry as whether government has "endorsed" religion); Wallace, 472
U.S. at 69-70 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting the constitutional clarity that the endorsement
model provides); Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 348 (1987) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (expanding the "endorsement" analysis); County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 658-67
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (setting forth a
"coercion" analysis). See also notes 170-85 and accompanying text.
13. See, for example, Edwards, 482 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating "[olur cases
interpreting and applying the purpose test have made such a maze of the Establishment Clause
that even the most conscientious governmental officials can only guess what motives will be
held unconstitutional"); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 110 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that "[t~he
three-part test has simply not provided adequate standards for deciding Establishment Clause
cases," and has produced "unworkable" constitutional precedents).
14. 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
15. Id. at 2149.
16. The Supreme Court consistently has denied organized religion a place in the public
schools. In fact, until recently, the Court appeared committed to a rigorous enforcement of the
"wall of separation" metaphor in public schools. See generally Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39,
reh'g denied, 449 U.S. 1104 (1980) (invalidating posting of the Ten Commandments in public
school classrooms despite alleged secular purposes); School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473
U.S. 373 (1985) (prohibiting the employment of public school teachers to teach secular subjects
in parochial schools); Edwards, 482 U.S. 578 (forbidding the teaching of "creation science" in
public schools); Wallace, 472 U.S. 38 (declaring unconstitutional legislation authorizing silent
prayer in the public school setting); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (invalidating a state
program that offered guidance and testing by public employees on parochial school property);
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (holding unconstitutional daily readings of Bible verses and the Lord's
Prayer in public schools); Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (declaring unconstitutional invocations and
benedictions at public school graduation ceremonies).
The rationale behind this vigorous refusal to allow any activity that could be construed as
government endorsement of religion in public schools was articulated by Justice Brennan:
Families entrust public schools with the education of their children, but condition their
trust on the understanding that the classroom will not purposely be used to advance
religious views that may conflict with the private beliefs of the student and his or her
family. Students in such institutions are impressionable and their attendance is
involuntary. The State exerts great authority and coercive power through mandatory
attendance requirements, and because of the students' emulation of teachers as role
models and the children's susceptibility to peer pressure.
Edwards, 482 U.S. at 584 (footnote and citations omitted).
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however, the Court blindly reaffirmed the controversial Lemon test,
which seemed all but dead following the decision in Lee v. Weisman,
17
and decided Lamb's Chapel on questionable free speech grounds.
This Recent Development analyzes Lamb's Chapel and focuses
on the Court's intense split over church-state issues as well as the
lack of clarity concerning the appropriate test to use in Establishment
Clause and free speech cases. Despite invoking Lemon to strike down
a policy that prohibited church access to school property for after-
hours use,18 the Lamb's Chapel decision fails to clarify the Court's
controversial Lemon test for determining when public school policies
violate the Establishment Clause.
Part II of this Recent Development discusses the facts and pro-
cedural posture of the Lamb's Chapel decision. Part III sets forth the
legal background and appropriate framework of analysis, emphasiz-
ing the various mandates of the First Amendment and the primary
Establishment Clause standards formulated by the Supreme Court in
cases preceding Lamb's Chapel. Part IV summarizes the opinions of
the majority and concurrences in the instant case. Part V analyzes
the Court's decision and suggests that it is inherently flawed because
it fails to provide adequate guidance to educational systems regarding
what types of religious activities are permissible, and because it con-
tinues to rely on the viability of the much-maligned Lemon test.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE
The plaintiffs, Lamb's Chapel, an Evangelical Christian
Church in the New York community of Center Moriches, and its pas-
tor, brought suit against the Center Moriches School District (the
"District"). The church alleged that the district violated its
constitutional rights by refusing its request to use school facilities to
show a religiously oriented film series on family values and child
17. 112 S. Ct. 2649. The Court in Weisman struck down as unconstitutional the practice
of nonsectarian prayer at public school graduation ceremonies. Although the Court arguably
reached the proper result in Weisman, it expressly declined to "reconsider [its] decision in
Lemon v. Kurtzman," choosing instead to rely on Justice Kennedy's "coercion" analysis. Id. at
2655. For a discussion of the coercion test, see notes 177-86 and accompanying text.
18. Although it seemed doubtful that the Lemon test would survive the Court's decision in
Weisman (see notes 186-89 and accompanying text), the Court in Lamb's Chapel, with Justice
White delivering the opinion, applied the test and stated without question that "Lemon,
however frightening it might be to some, has not been overruled." Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at
2148 n.7.
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rearing.19 Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that this denial
constituted an impermissible "violation of the Freedom of Speech and
Assembly Clauses, the Free Exercise Clause, and the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment, as well as the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."20 Prior to bringing suit, the
plaintiffs unsuccessfully petitioned the district for permission to use
the school facilities in connection with the film series.21 Pursuant to
established state law,22 the district had in place rules and regulations
regarding the use of school property when the property was not in use
for school purposes. Consistent with judicial interpretation of
existing state law,23 the district regulations expressly prohibited the
use of school property for religious purposes.24 Due to the admittedly
religious content of the film series, therefore, the district denied these
requests.
25
19. The six-part film series contained lectures by Dr. James Dobson, a licensed psy-
chologist and best selling author in the area of family issues. Specifically, "the film series would
discuss Dr. Dobson's views on the undermining influences of the media that could only be
counterbalanced by returning to traditional, Christian family values instilled at an early stage."
Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2144.
20. Id. at 2145.
21. Prior to the first request, the church applied for permission to use school facilities for
its Sunday morning services and for Sunday School. Id. at 2144 n.2.
22. Section 414 of the New York Education Law authorizes school boards to adopt reason-
able regulations for the use of school property for ten specific purposes when the property is not
in use for school purposes. Among the permitted uses is the holding of "social, civic and recrea-
tional meetings and entertainments, and other uses pertaining to the welfare of the community;
but such meetings, entertainment and uses shall be non-exclusive and shall be open to the
general public." N.Y. Educ. Law § 414(1)(c) (McKinney 1988). Religious use is not among those
activities enumerated in the statute. Religious use is not the only exclusion, however, because
the use of public school facilities for partisan political rallies and commercial enterprises is also
proscribed unless authorized by a district meeting or board of education vote. Id. § 414(1)(d)-(e).
23. A New York appellate court ruled that local school boards lacked statutory authority
to permit student Bible clubs to meet on school property because "[r]eligious purposes are not
included in the enumerated purposes for which a school may be used under section 414 of the
Education Law." Trietley v. Board of Educ. of City of Buffalo, 65 A.D.2d 1, 5-6, 409 N.Y.S.2d
912, 915 (1978). Moreover, in Deeper Life Christian Fellowship, Inc. v. Sobol, 948 F.2d 79, 83-84
(2d Cir. 1991), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit accepted Trietley as an authoritative
interpretation of state law. The Attorney General of New York also supported the Trietley
decision as the appropriate approach to proposed religious use of school property. Lamb's
Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2144. Consequently, according to state law, the Board of Education was
not authorized to grant Lamb's Chapel's request to use school property for religious activities.
24. Lamb's Chapel, 959 F.2d 381, 383 (2d Cir. 1992).
25. In summarily rejecting the church's request, the district responded that the films
"appear to be church related and therefore your request must be refused." Lamb's Chapel, 113
S. Ct. at 2145. The religious content of the film series was not debated at the lower court level,
and admittedly the film series was comprised of "family oriented movie[s] from a Christian
perspective." Lamb's Chapel, 736 F. Supp. 1247, 1248 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 1990). Lamb's Chapel even
conceded at the preliminary hearing that the film series was religious in nature and was
intended to convey a religious message. Id. at 1248.
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The plaintiffs fied the instant action in the District Court for
the Eastern District of New York seeking injunctive relief.2 6 The
district court denied this request and granted the district's motion for
summary judgment upon reconsideration. 7 The plaintiffs argued,
among other things, that the total exclusion of Lamb's Chapel from
school property violated the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment.2 8 In rejecting the plaintiffs' free speech claim, the court
emphasized that the district's facilities constituted a limited public
forum that consistently was closed for religious purposes.2 9 The court
considered this denial to be viewpoint-neutral, and therefore not
violative of the Free Speech Clause. 0 The plaintiffs asserted that
Supreme Court precedent gave Lamb's Chapel the right to utilize
school facilities, 31 but the district court ruled that these cases were
distinguishable from the case at bar.32 The district court found,
moreover, that Congress did not intend to force schools to allow
nonstudent use of their facilities."3
26. Lamb's Chapel, 736 F. Supp. 1247 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
27. Id. at 1254 (denying preliminary injunctive relief to plaintiffs); Lamb's Chapel, 770 F.
Supp. 91, 99 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (granting summary judgment to school board). Following the
district court's denial of declaratory and injunctive relief, Lamb's Chapel immediately appealed
to the Second Circuit. The appeal was later withdrawn, however, and the case subsequently
was returned to the district court for final disposition on the issue of injunctive relief. Id. at 92.
28. Lamb's Chapel, 736 F. Supp. at 1249.
29. Lamb's Chapel, 770 F. Supp. at 98-99 (relying on previous findings regarding the issue
of religious use of school property).
30. Id. at 99.
31. The plaintiffs asserted that Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), and Board of
Educ. of Westside Community Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990), gave them authority to use
the school facilities. Lamb's Chapel, 959 F.2d at 388. In Widmar, the Court held unconstitu-
tional as violative of the free speech guarantees of the First Amendment a university policy
which prohibited the use of school facilities by religious groups. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 266.
According to the Court, once a public school unilaterally has opened its doors for use by student
groups, it thereafter cannot exclude other groups because of the underlying content of their
speech. Id. at 277. Similarly, in Mergens, the Court struck down a school policy that uncondi-
tionally denied access to school facilities for religious purposes. The Court held that since the
school had allowed various student groups to meet on school premises, it could not, within the
confines of the Equal Access Act, deny access to religious student groups solely because of the
religious nature of the organizations. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 229.
32. According to Judge Wexler, the Mergens decision was "readily distinguishable" from
the instant case. Lamb's Chapel, 770 F. Supp. at 97. The district court found the Widmar
decision appropriately limited to "persons entitled to be [on the campuses of state universities],"
and likewise, Mergens addressed only student access to school facilities. Id. (quoting Widmar,
454 U.S. at 258). The Second Circuit likewise accepted this distinction and emphasized that
students "have a greater claim on the use of school property than outsiders." Lamb's Chapel,
959 F.2d at 389. These cases, therefore, provided no authority for the plaintiffs' position since
the representatives of Lamb's Chapel were "not students." Lamb's Chapel, 770 F. Supp. at 97.
33. This reasoning was based on the terms of the Equal Access Act, which forbids secon-
dary schools receiving federal funds from denying students the opportunity to meet on school
property because of the political or religious nature of their speech. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (1988).
Because Congress did not include the term 'limited public forum" in the Equal Access Act, the
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The district court further rejected the plaintiffs' various consti-
tutional claims34 The court determined that the district's policy was
neither hostile toward religion nor designed to advance nonreligious
organizations.3 5 The court also found that since the state had not
imposed substantial restraints upon the observance of religion, the
Free Exercise Clause was inapplicable in the instant case.36
Significantly, the court found no constitutional requirement that
schools allow religious groups to use school property once reasonable
and content-neutral regulations have been adopted. 7
The Second Circuit upheld the district court's decision "in all
respects. 31, Not unlike the district court, the Second Circuit found
that the public school constituted a limited public forum that had not
been utilized by religious groups in the past.39 The court reasoned
Supreme Court concluded that Congress "intended to establish a standard different from the
one established by our free speech cases." Mergens, 496 U.S. at 242. Consequently, the district
court determined that "[n]either Congress nor the Supreme Court [had] seen fit to require a
school district to open its doors to nonstudents who wish to use school facilities for the purpose
of conducting religious activities within a school." Lamb's Chapel, 770 F. Supp. at 98.
34. Lamb's Chapel, 770 F. Supp. at 98.
35. Lamb's Chapel, 736 F. Supp. at 1247, 1253.
36. Specifically, the court determined that the Free Exercise Clause had not been violated
because this was "neither a situation where the state has asserted coercive restraints on reli-
gious observation nor a situation where special circumstances require the state to accommodate
the plaintiffs' religious needs." Id. at 1253. Despite evidence that the school district had al-
lowed other religious organizations such as the Salvation Army and a Christian musical group
to utilize school facilities, the court nevertheless refused to hold that the District had observed
"a practice of permitting use by any organization for religious purposes." Id. According to the
district court, Lamb's Chapel was, therefore, not denied the free exercise of religion because the
school did not owe it any duty to use its facilities. Moreover, even if the district had allowed
other religious organizations to use school property in the past, those uses were consistent with
Section 414 of the New York Education Law which permitted social, civic, and recreational
purposes, but not religious use. N.Y. Educ. Law § 414(1)(c). According to the defendant school
district, moreover, it had not granted access to any organization that sought to use the facilities
for religious purposes. Brief for Respondents, 1992 WL 512049 at *22.
37. Lamb's Chapel, 736 F. Supp. at 1254 (stating that "[t]he Constitution does not require
a public school district to open its school buildings to indiscriminate use where the state has by
policy and practice circumscribed availability through reasonable and viewpoint-neutral regula-
tions'. The district court also held that since no religious group previously had been granted
access to school facilities, the plaintiffs' equal protection argument lacked any merit. Id. at 1253
(citing Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 980 (2d Cir. 1980)).
38. Lamb's Chapel, 959 F.2d at 389.
39. The plaintiffs once again argued that the school could not deny access to Lamb's
Chapel because it had allowed similar religious groups to utilize the school facilities in the
past-a Salvation Army Band benefit concert, a gospel music concert, and a lecture series
entitled "Psychology and the Unknown." Id. at 387-88. With respect to the Salvation Army
concert, the Second Circuit refused to accept the notion that a joint concert with the high school
band was "religious." Id. at 387 (reasoning that such action "hardly can be described as any
kind of religious use of school district property"). Similarly, since the purpose of the gospel
music concert was to support the black student scholarship fund, and because the music could
be enjoyed "by people of all religious beliefs as well as people of no religious beliefs," that activ-
ity was conducted in a "non-religious context and had a non-religious purpose." Id. at 388.
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that such property can remain nonpublic "except as to specified
uses,"40 and reasoned that since the district regulations were content-
neutral4l and based on legitimate government concerns, 42 the school
could not be compelled to grant access to Lamb's Chapel.43 The court
went on to note that, to be upheld, even restrictions which limit
access based upon subject matter or speaker identity need only be
reasonable and not discriminate on the basis of the viewpoint
expressed. 4 The Second Circuit found it constitutional for the district
to exclude all religious speakers from school property even though
other nonreligious speakers previously were granted access. As the
lower courts' holdings were inconsistent with prior Supreme Court
decisions, the Court granted certiorari.
45
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A The Free Exercise of Religion
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment generally
prohibits governmental intrusion into religious practices. 46 Since the
Finally, with respect to the lecture, the Second Circuit relied upon the testimony of Jerry Huck,
the psychotherapist who gave the lecture. Id. According to Mr. Huck, any religious reference
was merely "a fascinating sideline," and "was not the purpose of the [lecture]." Id. As a result,
the court denied that use by these groups indicated that the school facilities had been used for
religious purposes, reasoning that "incidental references to religion... and the performance of
music with religious overtones do not convert a secular program into a religious one." Id.
40. Id. at 386 (recognizing that "the school property in question falls within the
subcategory of 'limited public forum,' the classification that allows it to remain non-public
except as to specified uses' (citation omitted).
41. The court of appeals believed that the district regulations were content neutral be-
cause they consistently had been applied to preclude access to school facilities for all religious
organizations. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2147. According to the Second Circuit, Section 414
of the New York Education Law rendered the district facilities "a limited public forum from
which religious uses would be excluded." Lamb's Chapel, 959 F.2d at 387.
42. The court held that if the district regulations "reflect[ed] a legitimate government con-
cern and [did] not suppress expression merely because public officials oppose[d] the speaker's
view," the restriction on religious groups must be upheld. Lamb's Chapel, 959 F.2d at 386
(quoting Paulsen v. County of Nassau, 925 F.2d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 1991)). Accordingly, since the
court held the restriction to be content-neutral, it did not invalidate the restriction. Lamb's
Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2147.
43. Lamb's Chapel, 959 F.2d at 388.
44. Id. at 387.
45. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. 51 (1992). The Court found the Second Circuit's holding
"questionable under our decisions." Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2145.
46. U.S. Const., Amend. I provides that "Congress shall make no law.., prohibiting the
free exercise [of religion]." The Supreme Court has recognized that "religious beliefs need not be
acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment
protection." Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
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Supreme Court first applied the Free Exercise Clause to the individ-
ual states through the Fourteenth Amendment,47 it has interpreted
the provision to prohibit the government from exercising control over
individuals' religious convictions,48 from forcing individuals to accept
particular religious tenets,49 from punishing individuals because of
their religious stance,50 and from employing the taxing power of the
state to advance or inhibit the dissemination of religious views.51 As
the Court has noted, the ideals embodied in the Free Exercise Clause
reflect the diversity that traditionally has been respected in this
nation.52
See also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2225 (1993)
(quoting Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714); Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829,
834 (1989) (recognizing that First Amendment protection is not dependent on "responding to the
commands of a particular religious organization"). The Court has also noted, however, that not
every asserted belief warrants protection. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715 (stating that "[o]ne can,
of course, imagine an asserted claim so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to
be entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause"). It has been suggested that the Court
selectively defines religion in order to regulate certain conduct without violating the First
Amendment. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 318 n.4 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting)
(recognizing the "governmental power to hinder certain religious beliefs by denying their
character as such").
47. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n., 480 U.S. 136, 139-40 (1987) (stating
that the Free Exercise Clause is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment);
Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215-16 (1963); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399 (1923).
48. See, for example, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-77
(1990) (stating that the Free Exercise Clause precludes government regulation of religious
beliefs); Thomas, 450 U.S. at 713-14; Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437,453-54 (1971).
49. See, for example, Smith, 494 U.S. at 876-77 (stating that the government may not
compel affirmation of religious beliefs); Gillette, 401 U.S. at 453-54.
50. See, for example, Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 832-33
(1989) (holding that a state could not deny unemployment benefits to plaintiff who refused to
work on the basis of religious beliefs, despite the absence of affiliation with a particular reli-
gious group); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69-70 (1953) (dismissing the conviction of a
Jehovah's Witness that was based on the alleged exercise of religion); United States v. Ballard,
322 U.S. 78, 86-88 (1944) (stating that individuals may not be punished for religious beliefs);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (noting that the First Amendment protects
both belief in and exercise of religion).
51. See, for example, Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112-13 (1943); Follett v.
McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 577 (1944). The Supreme Court also has interpreted the Free
Exercise Clause to forbid government from lending the instruments of its power to either side in
controversies involving religious authority or dogma. See, for example, Presbyterian Church in
United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445-52
(1969); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 95-119 (1952); Serbian Eastern Orthodox
Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708-25 (1976).
52. The Supreme Court noted in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952):
We are a religious people.... We guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses. We
make room for as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual needs of man deem
necessary [and we] sponsor an attitude on the part of government that shows no
partiality to any one group and that lets each flourish according to the zeal of its
adherents and the appeal of its dogma.
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Generally, the Free Exercise Clause affords absolute protection
against governmental control of religious beliefs and opinions. 53 The
Supreme Court, however, has not extended the absolute protection
against governmental control of religious beliefs to governmental
regulation of religious conduct. 54 When conduct is at issue, the gov-
ernmental interest in promoting the health and safety of the general
,public may outweigh the individual's interest in engaging in uninhibi-
ted religious practice.55 This does not indicate, however, that religious
conduct is totally unprotected by the First Amendment, but rather
that it does not enjoy the absolute protection bestowed upon religious
beliefs. The Court has, in fact, extended the general protection of the
Free Exercise Clause to cover religious actions as well as religious




53. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986) (recognizing absolute protection of freedom
of individual belief); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963) (stating that "[tihe door of the
Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against any governmental regulation of religious
beliefs as such"). This protection is based on the idea that in our society, the freedom to think as
one chooses is absolutely protected, provided that the exercise of that freedom does not conflict
with the equally important rights of others. Justice Jackson argued, in West Virginia State Bd.
ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), that the freedom to believe as one chooses is the very
foundation of the First Amendment:
The very purpose of the Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.... If there
is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty,
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters
of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.
Id. at 638-42.
54. See, for example, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 145, 166 (1878) (stating
"[liaws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere
religious beliefs and opinions, they may with practices"); Department of Human Resources v.
Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 671 (1988) (holding that First Amendment protection does not extend to
criminal conduct); Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303-04 (observing that conduct must remain subject to
regulation for the protection of society).
55. As the Supreme Court stated in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972),
"activities of individuals, even when religiously based, are often subject to regulation by the
States in the exercise of their undoubted power to promote the health, safety, and general
welfare, or the Federal Government in the exercise of its delegated powers."
In the instant case, therefore, Lamb's Chapel could not rest its claim exclusively on the
fallacy that the Free Exercise Clause confers an unconditional and absolute right to utilize
school facilities based exclusively on the Free Exercise Clause. While it is true that the state
could not restrict the individuals associated with Lamb's Chapel from maintaining their beliefs,
it could, consistent with constitutional mandates, restrict the conduct resulting from those
beliefs. Id.
56. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402-03 (illustrating some degree of protection of religious actions
under the Free Exercise Clause); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 219-20 (noting that there are areas of
religious conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause). As Justice Roberts suggested in
Cantwell v. Connecticut, conduct, though subject to greater regulation than belief, is not wholly
outside the scope of the First Amendment: "[Free Exercise] embraces two concepts,-freedom to
1950
1994] LAMB'S CHAPEL 1951
Religious groups and individual citizens often challenge state
laws as violative of the Free Exercise Clause, alleging that the laws
impose penalties upon them because of their particular religious
beliefs.58 In Sherbert v. Verner,59 for example, the Court held that a
Seventh-Day Adventist could not have his unemployment compensa-
tion conditioned upon his agreement to work on Saturdays.60 In its
reasoning, the Court noted that while the state had a legitimate in-
terest in defining the class eligible for unemployment benefits, it
could not deny those benefits to certain individuals because of their
religious beliefs.61
The test has developed, therefore, that to prevail under the
Free Exercise exemption doctrine,62 a plaintiff must show either: (1)
that the state has conditioned receipt of a government benefit upon
activity that is inconsistent with a religious faith; or (2) that the state
has denied a government benefit because of activities deemed essen-
believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot
be .... In every case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a
permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom." 310 U.S. at 303-04.
57. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166-68 (holding polygamy to be outside the protection of the
Free Exercise Clause). Only laws which have more than an incidental effect on religious
practice are violative of the Free Exercise Clause. See Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt.,
366 U.S. 617, 630-31 (1961) (holding that a statute requiring store closure on Sundays was not
violative of the free exercise of the Jewish faith); Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 740 (D.C. Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1056 (1983) (holding that plaintiffs must prove a burden on their
exercise of religion in order to establish a claim under the Free Exercise Clause). In determin-
ing whether a regulation places more than an incidental burden on religious practice, courts will
usually balance the severity of the restriction against the importance of the governmental
interest served. See, for example, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 669-
70 (1988) (balancing the denial of unemployment benefits against the state's interest in public
safety); Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 140-41 (holding that the state has no compelling interest in denying
the plaintiffs unemployment benefits). In Lamb's Chapel, the lower courts held that the state
had not placed a coercive restraint on the free exercise of religion, and found that the state had
legitimate interests in restricting church access to school facilities. Lamb's Chapel, 959 F.2d at
389; Lamb's Chapel, 736 F. Supp. at 1253.
58. The typical scenario involves attempts by religious observers to exempt themselves
from general laws by arguing that application of the laws, and the imposed penalties for non-
compliance of those laws, violate the Free Exercise Clause. One commentator has suggested
that Free Exercise litigation in modern jurisprudence has consisted almost entirely of "requests
for exemption rather than for general invalidation of restrictive laws." Michael W. McConnell,
The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1409,
1413 (1990). It is precisely in these situations that the potential conflict between establishment
and free exercise arises. See note 2. A legislative effort to accommodate religious believers by
granting them an exemption from general laws is, arguably, an establishment of religion.
59. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
60. The State Unemployment Commission rejected the petitioner's application for unem-
ployment benefits because the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act denied
benefits to those who had failed, without good cause, to accept suitable employment. Id. at 400-
01.
61. Id. at 410.
62. The exemption doctrine relates to attempts by individuals to exempt themselves from
the scope of general laws based on their personal religious beliefs. See note 58.
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tial to that religious faith.63 Traditionally, once the plaintiff demon-
strated that the law at issue encroached upon the free exercise of
religion," the burden shifted to the state to demonstrate that the law
was necessary to serve a compelling secular objective and that the
methods employed were the least restrictive means of achieving that
objective.65
In a dramatic break with precedent, however, the Supreme
Court abandoned the traditional compelling interest test previously
applied in Free Exercise exemption cases.6 In Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,67 two members
of the Native American Church were discharged from jobs at a drug
rehabilitation center because they previously had ingested peyote as
63. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717-20
(1981) (holding that state denial of unemployment benefits to a Jehovah's Witness who refused
to work in a munitions factory violated the Free Exercise Clause).
64. For excellent critiques of the requisite "burden" on the free exercise of religion, see
Michael W. McConnell and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious
Freedom, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 38-45 (1989); Ira C. Lupa, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of
Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 933 (1989). The rationale behind
the benefit conditioning theory is that denials of important government benefits exert tremen-
dous pressure on those excluded to forsake their own religious beliefs in an attempt to obtain
the benefit. Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 141. As the Court noted in Thomas:
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a
religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by
religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his
behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. While the compulsion
may be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless substantial.
450 U.S. at 717-18.
65. For analysis of the compelling interest test required in rebuttal by the state, see
Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential but Unanalyzed Term in
Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. Rev. 917, 941-62 (1988) and McConnell and Posner, 56
U. Chi. L. Rev. at 45-54. See also Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718-19 (finding no compelling interest to
justify withholding employment benefits from an individual who refused to work in a munitions
plant for religious reasons); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215 (holding state intrusion in universal
education not compelling enough to justify compulsory education in direct conflict with beliefs of
Amish faith); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406-07 (finding no compelling interest to justify denial of
unemployment benefits to an individual who refused to work on Saturdays because of alleged
religious convictions).
66. Prior to Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the United States
Supreme Court frequently had required the state to produce evidence of a compelling
governmental interest in order to justify substantial infringements placed upon the free exercise
of religion. See, for example, Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718 (emphasizing the familiar maxim that
"[t]he state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive
means of achieving some compelling state interest"); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215 (reasoning that
"only those interests of the highest order . . .can overbalance legitimate claims to the free
exercise of religion'; Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (recognizing that the
proper inquiry in free exercise cases is "whether a compelling governmental interest justifies
the burden'; Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 141-44 (refusing to consider anything less than the vigorous
standard of strict scrutiny for burdens on religious exercise).
67. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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part of a religious ceremony.68 These individuals subsequently were
denied unemployment benefits because, according to the Oregon
Department of Human Resources, they had been discharged for work-
related "misconduct.69 The Oregon Supreme Court rejected the ar-
guments of the Employment Division7° and found that the state failed
to establish the requisite compelling interest to justify the substantial
burden placed upon the plaintiff's free exercise of religion.
71
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court vacated the
Oregon Supreme Court's decision and remanded the case for a deter-
mination of whether religious use of peyote was lawful within the
state.72 The Oregon Supreme Court, believing that the legality of
peyote use was not dispositive, 73 affirmed its previous decision. 74
68. Id. at 874. The Oregon Supreme Court noted the long history of ceremonial peyote use
within the Native American Church and recognized the sincerity of the plaintiffs' belief in this
faith. Smith v. Employment Div., 307 Or. 68, 763 P.2d 146, 147-48 (1988). The court also
pointed to previous cases that exempted the religious use of peyote from generally applicable
laws criminalizing its ingestion. Id. at 148 (citing People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813
(1964)).
69. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874. The Oregon unemployment compensation law disqualified
any applicant discharged for work related misconduct. Smith, 301 Or. 209, 721 P.2d 445, 448
(1986).
70. Smith, 721 P.2d at 451. The claimants initially sought relief from the Oregon Court of
Appeals. Smith, 75 Or. App. 764, 709 P.2d 246 (1985). The court of appeals reversed and re-
manded to the Oregon Employment Appeals Board for reconsideration. Id. The Oregon
Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals decision, but found that remand to the state
board was unneccessary. Smith, 721 P.2d at 446.
71. Smith, 721 P.2d at 450-51. The Oregon Supreme Court accepted the construct pre-
sented in Sherbert and Thomas and thus held that in order to justify significant burdens on the
free exercise of religion, the state must "demonstrate that the constraint on religious activity is
the least restrictive means of achieving a 'compelling' state interest." Id. at 449 (citations
omitted). Finding that the state's "financial interest in the payment of benefits from the
unemployment insurance fund" was not compelling "when weighed against the free exercise
rights of the claimant[,]" the Oregon Supreme Court found that Smith was entitled to receive
unemployment benefits. Id. at 450-51.
72. Smith, 485 U.S. at 674. As Justice Stevens noted, the Court granted certiorari be-
cause it disagreed with the Oregon Supreme Court's disposition concerning the legality of
peyote use. Id. at 662.
73. Under Oregon law, the possession of peyote is a crime punishable by imprisonment for
up to 10 years. Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 475.992(4)(a), 161.605(2) (1987). The Oregon Court of Appeals,
moreover, previously determined that religious users of peyote were not exempt from criminal
prosecution. See State v. Soto, 21 Or. App. 794, 537 P.2d 142, 144 (1975). Upon its initial con-
sideration in Smith, the Oregon Supreme Court found that the legality of peyote use was not
dispositive on the issue of denial of unemployment benefits. As the Oregon court stated:
Mhe legality of ingesting peyote does not affect our analysis of the state's interest. The
state's interest in denying unemployment benefits to a claimant discharged for
religiously motivated misconduct must be found in the unemployment compensation
statutes, not in the criminal statutes proscribing the use of peyote .... "[Tlhe legality of
[claimant's] ingestion of peyote has little direct bearing on this case."
Smith, 721 P.2d at 450 (quoting the findings of the Employment Division).
The United States Supreme Court, however, found the legality of an outright ban on peyote
relevant to the state's denial of employment benefits for misconduct. Smith, 485 U.S. at 670
(stating that "if a State has prohibited through its criminal laws certain kinds of religiously
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The United States Supreme Court once again granted certiorari to
determine whether a law prohibiting all uses of peyote was
constitutional.75
The Supreme Court, while noting that the Free Exercise
Clause protects both religious belief and religiously motivated con-
duct,76 nevertheless refused to apply the compelling interest test
announced in Sherbert v. Verner.7 7 While distinguishing previous
cases in which the Court arguably applied the compelling interest
test, 8 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, asserted that laws
which do not specifically target religious conduct, yet incidentally
motivated conduct without violating the First Amendment, it certainly follows that it may
impose the lesser burden of denying unemployment compensation benefits to persons who
engage in that conduct").
On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Oregon reiterated
its previous position concerning the relevancy of peyote's lawful use and stated that "outright
prohibition of good faith religious use of peyote by adult members of the Native American
Church would violate the First Amendment directly and as interpreted by Congress." Smith,
763 P.2d at 148.
74. Smith, 763 P.2d at 150.
75. Smith, 489 U.S. 1077 (1989).
76. According to the Supreme Court, the First Amendment, in addition to guarding
against government intrusion on religious beliefs, also protects to a certain extent the physical
acts that accompany sincere religious beliefs:
[Tihe "exercise of religion" often involves not only belief and profession but the
performance of (or abstention from) physical acts: assembling with others for a worship
service, participating in sacramental use of bread and wine, proselytizing, abstaining
from certain foods or certain modes of transportation. It would be true ... that a State
would be "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" if it sought to ban such acts or
abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the
religious belief that they display.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990). The Court then distinguished the present case by recognizing
that the First Amendment does not immunize religious observers from criminal laws that do not
specifically target religious practice. Id. at 878. The Court, while not directly countering its
previous language concerning the belief/action distinction, went on to conclude that merely
because religious belief is protected, the conduct accompanying that belief is not automatically
exempt from regulation. Id. at 882 (recognizing that the First Amendment does not require
protection for all religiously motivated conduct).
77. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In Smith, the Supreme Court stated without question that the
Sherbert test was "inapplicable" to requests for exemption from generally applicable criminal
laws. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885.
78. Justice Scalia attempted to distinguish, perhaps inappropriately, a sizeable body of
Supreme Court precedent which applied the Sherbert compelling interest test by noting that no
law had ever been declared unconstitutional under this construct "except the denial of
unemployment compensation." Smith, 494 U.S. at 883. Justice Scalia admitted that even in
those rare contexts where the test arguably was applied, the Court, in reality, failed to conduct
a serious compelling interest inquiry. Id. (stating that "[a]lthough we have sometimes
purported to apply the Sherbert test in contexts other than [unemployment compensation], we
have always found the test satisfied) (citations omitted). It has been argued by some that the
Court never applied a true compelling interest test even when it purportedly did so. Michael W.
McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1109, 1127-28
(1990).
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infringe upon its exercise, are constitutional if they are "neutral" and
"generally applicable."7 9
Although supported by some, 80 the Smith decision produced a
flood of criticism.31 Responding to this criticism, Congress passed the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA")82 which, in effect, re-
quires both state and federal governments 83 to provide a compelling
interest to justify any law which substantially interferes with the free
exercise of religion.84 Although arguably outside the scope of legisla-
tive authority,85 RFRA directly counters Justice Scalia's reasoning in
79. In support of this contention, the Court stated that "the right of free exercise does not
relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general appli-
cability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes
(or proscribes).' Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3
(1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)). In an attempt to distinguish a line of cases in
which generally applicable and neutral laws were declared unconstitutional, the Court noted
that in each of these cases, the right of free exercise was not analyzed in isolation, but in
connection with other constitutional protections, presenting a "hybrid" situation. Id. at 881-82.
Some commentators have criticized the Court's attempt to distinguish Smith on this basis alone.
See, for example, McConnell, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1122 (cited in note 78); James D. Gordon III,
Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 91, 97-100 (1991).
80. See William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 308, 309-10 (1991).
81. The fundamental objection to the Smith decision is that by abandoning at least the
appearance of strict scrutiny in free exercise exemption cases, the decision eliminates any
realistic hope for the protection of uninhibited religious practice. See generally John Delaney,
Police Power Absolutism and Nullifying the Free Exercise Clause: A Critique of Oregon v.
Smith, 25 Ind. L. Rev. 71 (1991); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 1.
82. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb (West Supp. 1994). The express purpose of the Act was "to
restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder
and to guarantee its application in all cases where the free exercise of religion is substantially
burdened by government." Id. § 2000bb(b)(1) (citations omitted).
83. Id. § 2000bb-3(a). The section provides: "This chapter applies to all Federal and State
law, and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted
before or after November 16, 1993."
84. The Act provides in part:
(a) In general
Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in
subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Exception
Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person-
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.
Id. § 2000bb-l(a)-(b).
85. At least one federal court has applied RFRA retroactively to give effect to Congress's
desire to reinstate the compelling interest test in cases involving a substantial burden on the
free exercise of religion. See Lawson v. Dugger, 844 F. Supp. 1538, 1542 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
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Smith, which suggested that the fate of religious minorities is better
left to the political process. 5
Although the continued survival of the free exercise exemption
has been questioned, 7 the focus of the debate is whether the Free
Exercise Clause exists solely to prevent the government from singling
out particular religious groups for disability,88 or whether the clause
protects religion against even the incidental effects of government
action.8 9
In Lamb's Chapel, the plaintiffs asserted that the denial of
access to school facilities constituted a violation of the Free Exercise
Clause.90 On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected this assertion. The
court held that the government properly can impose a total restriction
on certain types of speech, provided that the restriction does not
86. In an interesting passage, Justice Scalia noted that in a democratic system, those
whose religious freedoms are threatened must seek protection within the confines of the
political process. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. Justice Scalia then attempted to subvert the true role
of the Supreme Court by arguing that the legislature, and not the Court, is better suited to
decide issues of individual liberty:
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place
at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but
that unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a system
in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social
importance of all laws against the certainty of all religious beliefs.
Id.
87. According to one scholar, the Supreme Court has rejected every claim for an exemp-
tion since 1972, excluding the narrow cases involving unemployment benefits which are covered
by Sherbert. McConnell, 103 Harv. L. Rev. at 1417 (cited in note 58). Moreover, members of the
Court have expressed serious reservations about the necessity of judicially created exemptions
from federal laws on the basis of religious beliefs. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 723 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (stating "the Free Exercise Clause does not... require the State to conform that
statute to the dictates of religious conscience of any group"); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,
263 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring) (agreeing that "there is virtually no room for a
'constitutionally required exemption' on religious grounds from a valid... law that is entirely
neutral in its general application"). See generally Philip B. Kurland, The Irrelevance of the
Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 Vill. L.
Rev. 3 (1978).
88. Judge Bork approves of this "no-exemption" policy. He suggests that the purpose of
the Free Exercise Clause could have been to guard against "laws that directly and intentionally
penalize religious observance," and not to prevent indirect effects on religious practice. Robert
H. Bork, The Supreme Court and the Religion Clauses, in 'Turning the Religion Clauses on
Their Heads: Proceedings of the National Religious Freedom Conference of the Catholic League
for Religious and Civil Rights 83, 84 (Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights, 1988).
Under this construct, denying exemptions to all religious groups would ensure observance of the
Free Exercise Clause, and religious observers could never challenge facially neutral legislation
as violative of the Free Exercise Clause. McConnell, 103 Harv. L. Rev. at 1418-19.
89. According to scholarly commentary, the "exemptions" doctrine would also protect
against the incidental and unintended effects of government action. McConnell states: "the
remedy generally is to leave the government policy in place, but to carve out an exemption when
the application of the policy impinges on religious practices without adequate justification."
McConnell, 103 Harv. L. Rev. at 1418.
90. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2141.
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discriminate within the class of speakers on the basis of the viewpoint
expressed.91 Accordingly, the lower court applied a restrictive view of
the Free Exercise Clause and upheld the district's restrictions because
it found that all religious groups similarly had been denied access. 92
B. The Unstable Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
Although the drafters of the First Amendment sought to guar-
antee religious autonomy, they also attempted to create a balance
between religious freedom and the separation of church and state.9
3
The Establishment Clause,94 applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment,95 prohibits governmental promotion of, or
entanglement with, religion and forbids state discrimination toward
individuals on the basis of their religious beliefs and practices.96 The
purpose of the Establishment Clause, as articulated by the Court, is
to prevent active governmental involvement in religious affairs. 97
Although the Establishment Clause's "opaque8 language pro-
vides the basis for church-state separation, the Supreme Court has
yet to reach a consensus on how to interpret the language of the
Clause itself.9 Early Establishment Clause analysis advocated a total
and distinct separation between the church and the state,00 relying,
91. The court of appeals held that in a "limited public forum," government may "impose a
blanket exclusion on certain types of speech" provided that the exclusion does not "selectively
deny access" among "expressive activities of a certain genre." Lamb's Chapel, 959 F.2d at 387.
92. Id.
93. See note 4.
94. The Establishment Clause mandates: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion. . . ." U.S. Const., Amend. I.
95. See, for example, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); Everson v. Board
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
96. See, for example, County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S 573, 590-91 (1989); Edwards
v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 582 (1987); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for Blind, 474 U.S.
481, 484-85 (1986); School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 383 (1985); Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 123-24 (1982);
Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 654, 657 (1980); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S.
229, 236 (1977); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40 (1980); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672,
678-79 (1971).
97. The Court held in Walz v. Tax Commission., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970), that the purpose
of the Establishment Clause is to protect against "sponsorship, financial support, and active in-
volvement of the sovereign in religious activity."
98. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). Chief Justice Burger noted in Lemon
that the Establishment Clause produces a "blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending
on all the circumstances of a particular relationship" Id. at 614.
99. See note 13.
100. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16 (stating that "[i]n the words of Jefferson, the clause
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between
Church and State"); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) (noting that "the
First Amendment ... erected a wall between Church and State which must be kept high and
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in part, on Thomas Jefferson's "wall of separation" metaphor. 10' This
absolutist approach, however, was not universally accepted by the
Court, even during the early phase of Establishment Clause analy-
sis,10 2 and formally was rejected by the Court in later cases.' 03
Upon rejection of the absolutist approach, the Court in Zorach
v. Clauson0 4 focused on an accommodation approach towards relig-
ious practices. 0 5 The critical distinction under this model is between
the perceived and unconstitutional advocation of religion on one hand,
and a permissible accommodation of religion on the other.106 When
governmental action is designed, not to promote one religious ideology
over another, but to facilitate the uninhibited free exercise of religion,
impregnable"); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962) (holding that a state's use of public
schools to encourage daily prayer breached the constitutional wall between church and state).
101. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164 (quoting Reply to Messrs. Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim
Robbins, and Stephen S. Nelson, A Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association, in the State
of Connecticut (Jan. 1, 1802), in H.A. Washington, ed., 8 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 113
(J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1869)). In several cases, the Court expressed dissatisfaction with the
viability of this metaphor for constitutional analysis. Referring to the "wall of separation,"
Justice Reed argued that "[a] rule of law should not be drawn from a figure of speech."
McCollum, 333 U.S. at 247 (Reed, J., dissenting). Later, Justice Stewart reasoned that in
Establishment Clause cases, "the Court's task ... is not responsibly aided by the uncritical
invocation of metaphors like the 'wall of separation' .... " Vitale, 370 U.S. at 445 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). Justice Rehnquist also stated: "If a constitutional theory has no basis in the
history of the amendment it seeks to interpret, is difficult to apply and yields unprincipled
results, I see little use in it." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 112 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Finally, Justice Kennedy argued that "[slubstantial revision of our Establishment
Clause doctrine may be in order ...." County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 656 (Kennedy, J., joined
by Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Scalia, J.J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
102. Only one year after Everson, a case which articulated the wall of separation standard,
Justice Reed, writing a dissenting opinion in McCollum, argued that the Establishment Clause
could not be regarded as imposing
an absolute prohibition against every conceivable situation where [church and state]
may work together any more than the other provisions of the First Amendment-free
speech, free press-are absolutes.... Devotion to the great principle of religious liberty
should not lead us into a rigid interpretation of the constitutional guarantee that
conflicts with accepted habits of our people.
McCollum, 333 U.S. at 256.
103. In Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), the Court held that the First Amendment
does not require absolute separation between church and state in every conceivable situation:
The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every and all respects there shall
be a separation of Church and State. Rather, it studiously defines the manner, the
specific ways, in which there shall be no concert or union or dependency one on the
other. That is the common sense of the matter. Otherwise the state and religion would
be aliens to each other-hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly.
Id. at 312.
In Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court clearly and unambiguously abrogated
the idea of total separation, characterizing the absolutist approach as "simplistic" and impracti-
cal. Id. at 678.
104. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
105. See note 52.
106. Id.
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the action is entirely consistent with the Establishment Clause.107 In
later cases, the accommodation approach, though based upon the
traditional role which religion has played in society, was cited with
approval by the Court.108
The modern test for evaluating whether a statute or state
policy violates the Establishment Clause emerged in Lemon v.
Kurtzman.0 9 In Lemon, the Court ruled that a Pennsylvania statute
allowing reimbursement for parochial school teachers' salaries and
instructional materials, and a Rhode Island law mandating salary
supplements for nonpublic school teachers of certain secular subjects
violated the Establishment Clause.11 ° In reaching its decision, the
Court formulated a three-prong test for determining Establishment Clause
violations.,' To pass constitutional review under the Lemon test,
government practices must: (1) "have a secular legislative purpose";
(2) have a "principal or primary effect... that neither advances nor
inhibits religion"; and (3) "not foster 'an excessive government
entanglement with religion."' 2 A violation of any part of the Lemon
test constitutes a violation of the Establishment Clause." 3
107. The Supreme Court has noted that accommodation of religion does not violate the
Establishment Clause. This recognition derives from the inherent conflict between the Free
Exercise and the Establishment clauses. See notes 2-3 and accompanying text. By allowing
government to accommodate but not advocate religion, the state can satisfy the Free Exercise
Clause without becoming overtly involved in religious affairs. As one commentator has noted:
[A]ccommodation to religion is a practice undertaken specifically for the purpose of
facilitating the free exercise of religion... "[for] individuals whose religious beliefs and
practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or [by creating] without state
involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish."
McConnell, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. at 3-4 (cited in note 2) (quoting McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618,
639 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
108. In Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), and County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
573 (1989), the Court cited the accommodation approach and recognized the role that religion
traditionally has played in American society. In Lynch, the Court invoked the "Unbroken
history of official acknowledgment by all three branches of government of the role of religion in
American life" in upholding the constitutionality of a Pawtucket, Rhode Island nativity scene.
465 U.S. at 674. Significantly, the Court in County of Allegheny drew a fundamental distinction
between acknowledgment and advocacy of religious practice in striking down a Christmas
creche placed on the county courthouse, holding that the government can acknowledge
Christmas as a cultural holiday, but cannot suggest to people that it supports the underlying
message of that holiday. 492 U.S. at 601. In dissent, Justice Kennedy suggested that the
government should be given great latitude in recognizing the role of religion in society. Id. at
655-57. In any respect, the absolutist approach began to break down almost immediately
following its inception, and the Court accepted that, based on tradition, the state should be
afforded some degree of control over the accommodation/advocacy distinction. McCollum, 333
U.S. at 256.
109. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
110. Id. at 624-25.
111. Id. at 612-13.
112. Id. (citations omitted). The three-prong test articulated in Lemon was, in reality, a
combination of several cases that preceded the decision. The original source of the "purpose'
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The first prong of the Lemon test requires that the law under
review have a "secular legislative purpose.11114  Although the Court
has varied the language of this requirement in different circum-
stances,1 5 the general approach taken by the Court is that the gov-
ernment need only show a primary, and not an exclusive, secular
purpose." 6 As a result, governmental action can have a "secular" pur-
pose, even if motivated in part by religious objectives. On the other
hand, laws may be deemed to serve a nonsecular purpose if they
either promote religion in general, 117 or advance any specific religious
doctrine."18 In practice, however, the Court has been lenient in find-
ing a secular purpose."9
Under the second prong of the Lemon test, the governmental
conduct must, in effect, neither advance nor inhibit religion.
1 20
and "effect" prongs is Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). In Schempp, the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional a Pennsylvania statute which authorized public schools to
begin the school day with readings from the Bible. Id. at 222. In striking down the law, the
Court stated that legislative action must have a "secular legislative purpose and a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion." Id. at 222 (citing Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1 (1947) and McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961)). The final prong of the
test, "excessive entanglement with religion," has its origin in Walz v. Tax Commission., 397 U.S.
664 (1970), in which the Court upheld a tax exemption for religious groups on the ground that
this exemption would prevent excessive entanglement by the government in religious affairs.
Id. at 674.
113. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
114. Id.
115. See, for example, Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (stating that "the First
Amendment requires that a statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose
to advance religion'); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681 n.6 (observing that "[w]ere the test that the
government must have 'exclusively secular' objectives, much of the conduct and legislation [the]
Court has approved in the past would have been invalidated"!; Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41
(1980) (holding that the "pre-eminent purpose" of a law must not be "plainly religious in
nature'; Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 599 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that,
in order to invalidate legislation, "[tihe religious purpose must predominate').
116. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56; Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681 n.6; Schempp, 374 U.S. at 296-303
(Brennan, J., concurring).
117. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 585 (citing Wallace, 472 U.S. at 52-53).
118. Id. (citing Stone, 449 U.S. at 41, and Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968)).
119. See Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 485-86 (1986)
(labeling the analysis under the purpose prong "simple" in upholding state financing of disabled
individuals training at a Christian college); School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373,
383 (1985) (finding "no dispute as to the first test" in a school time-sharing program); Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983) (recognizing that "little time need be spent" on the purpose
inquiry); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 123 (1982) (stating that "there can be little
doubt" that a law giving schools and churches authority to block issuance of liquor licenses
within 500 feet of property "embraces valid secular legislative purposes'; Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263, 271-72 (1981) (finding the first prong of Lemon "clearly met" in recognizing that
religious student group access to university facilities does not violate the Establishment
Clause); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977) (finding "no difficulty with the first prong of
this three-part test" in evaluating a state law providing educational materials to nonpublic
schools).
120. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
1960
LAMB'S CHAPEL
Generally, the Court has required that the principal or primary effect
of the conduct be to advance or inhibit religion before it would declare
the governmental restriction unconstitutional under Lemon.121 In
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist,122 however, the Court ex-
panded the "effects" prong of the test. The Court in Nyquist held that
the "primary" language of Lemon did not automatically immunize
governmental action from further review, reasoning that to force the
Court to ascertain whether an effect was the law's "primary" one was
inconsistent with past cases.123 Moreover, the Court held that the
impact on religious autonomy must be "direct and substantial" as
opposed to "remote and incidental" for a law to run afoul of
constitutional mandates. 24 State involvement in religion that creates
a symbolic merger of church and state violates the "effects" prong of
the Lemon test,125 as does an appearance of state involvement in
religious affairs, 126 an inference of government hostility toward
religion, 27 and a government subsidy to religion. 2
The primary focus of the final prong of the Lemon test is on
procedural involvement in religious operations by the government. 29
Lower courts have held that continuous state monitoring or supervi-
sion of religious activity violates the "entanglement" prong.130 The
121. Id.
122. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
123. Id. at 783 n.39 (reasoning "[wle do not think that such metaphysical judgments are
either possible or necessary. Our cases simply do not support the notion that a law found to
have a 'primary' effect to promote some legitimate end under the State's police power is immune
from further examination'.
124. Id.
125. In Ball, the Court struck down a program under which teachers, hired by the public
school system, taught classes to nonpublic students, using resources from the public financial
system. The Court held that the "symbolic union of church and state" created through the
arrangement may convey the image that the State prefers one religion, or any religion, in
violation of the Establishment Clause. 473 U.S. at 397.
126. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635
F.2d 971, 978 (2d Cir. 1980), that "the mere appearance of secular involvement in religious
activities might indicate that the state has placed its imprimatur on a particular religious creed.
This symbolic inference is too dangerous to permit."
127. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
128. See Ball, 473 U.S. at 397.
129. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613; Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 755 (1976).
130. See, for example, Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist., 865 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989)
(holding action necessary to ensure safety and discipline of students requires a level of state
supervision that amounts to excessive entanglement), modified, 874 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1989);
Bell v. Little Axe Indep. Sch. Dist., 766 F.2d 1391, 1406-07 (10th Cir. 1985) (finding that a policy
of monitoring content of all student meetings would amount to excessive entanglement when
applied to religious groups); Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 669
F.2d 1038, 1047 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding that the supervision of student prayer groups by school
officials creates excessive entanglement in violation of the Establishment Clause); Brandon v.
Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 979 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding that school supervision of student
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state also becomes excessively entangled with religion through the
expenditure of public funds to assist religious operations.'3' In these
cases, the Court examines whether the expenditure is necessary to
accommodate religion, or whether the funding amounts to an
impermissible entanglement in religious affairs. 132  Generally, the
Court is willing to accept some entanglement with religion if the
policy has a secular purpose and effect. 133  Although some
entanglement through accommodation may be accepted by the Court,
any effect on religious activities still must satisfy the guidelines of
Lemon.'m
Although the framework provided by Lemon remains impor-
tant in Establishment Clause cases, 3 5 from a practical standpoint,
there is ample reason to doubt its continued viability. The language
of Lemon, though precise, is not a "talismanic rule of law."1 36 As the
Court itself acknowledged, the line between permissible and imper-
missible government action should not, and cannot, be guided by any
single formula.'3 7  Instead, the characterization of governmental ac-
tion as violative of the Establishment Clause depends on the unique
facts of each individual case.138
This Recent Development suggests that the Supreme Court
has utilized Lemon only when a bright line rule best served expedi-
ency and a particular outcome. On other occasions, however, the
religious organizations to ensure voluntary participation constitutes impermissible entangle-
ment).
131. See Ruti Teitel, The Unconstitutionality of Equal Access Policies and Legislation
Allowing Organized Student-Initiated Religious Activities in the Public High Schools: A
Proposal for a Unitary First Amendment Forum Analysis, 12 Hastings Const. L. Q. 529, 576-77
(1985); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210 (1948).
132. See note 107 and accompanying text.
133. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771 (1973) (stating "not every law
that confers an 'indirect,' 'remote' or 'incidental' benefit upon religious institutions is, for that
reason alone, constitutionally invalid"). See also Edwin G. West, Constitutional Judgment on
Non-Public School Aid: Fresh Guidelines or New Roadblocks? 35 Emory L. J. 795, 808-14 (1986)
(stating that laws which primarily serve secular purposes, but have incidental effects of
advancing religion, are nevertheless valid).
134. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613. This factor is one of the central criticisms of the entangle-
ment analysis, in that it delegates virtually total discretion to judges to decide what constitutes
"excessive" governmental involvement in religious affairs. Michael S. Paulsen, Lemon Is Dead,
43 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 795, 809 (1993).
135. See Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2148 (employing the Lemon three-part test).
136. Daniel 0. Conkle, Lemon Lives, 43 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 865, 867 (1993).
137. Referring to the "entanglement" inquiry, the Court in Lemon noted, "the line of
separation, far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all
the circumstances of a particular relationship." 403 U.S. at 614. See also Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. 349, 359 (1975) (stating that the Lemon criteria "must not be viewed as setting the precise
limits to the necessary constitutional inquiry'.
138. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614.
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Court ignored the test entirely or altered the basic structure of the
test to such an extent that it no longer resembled the original three-
prong inquiry. In reality, the Court is unwilling to confime itself to
any single test when confronted with the complexities of
Establishment Clause issues. 139 Several members of the Court join in
the criticism of Lemon, but they are unable to agree on a realistic
replacement. Although Lemon may be inadequate, the Court's refusal
or inability to articulate a cohesive and functional standard serves
only to muddle the already confusing area of church-state interaction.
C. The Court's Malleable Lemon Framework
On more than one occasion, the Supreme Court simply ignored
or briefly mentioned Lemon in an Establishment Clause case. In
Marsh v. Chambers,40 the Court rejected an Establishment Clause
challenge to a state-financed opening prayer in the legislature
without applying Lemon.'4' Writing for the majority, Chief Justice
Burger conducted a historical analysis,12 relying on the tradition and
widespread existence of the practice since colonial times.143 Finding a
"unique history" of legislative prayer, the Court upheld the practice
without conducting any substantive inquiry into Establishment
Clause concerns. 144 In dissent, Justice Brennan argued that the state
legislature's practice was irreconcilable with the Lemon test and thus
could not be upheld.145
139. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) (holding that the Court is "unwilling[]
to be confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area').
140. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
141. Id. at 791.
142. In fact, several decisions by the United States Supreme Court interpreting the
Establishment Clause have utilized historical analysis to discern the intent and purpose of the
drafters. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425-33 (1962) (noting that the practice of
establishing government-composed prayers for religious services caused many colonists to leave
England in search of religious freedom); Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 671 (1970)
(emphasizing the importance of history in discovering underlying constitutional objectives). It
is interesting to note some of the conflicting approaches of history formulated by the justices of
the Supreme Court. In Wallace v. Jaffree, for example, Justice Rehnquist attempted to utilize
an historical analysis to discredit the absolutist position, itself an historical approach once
advocated by the Court. 472 U.S. 38, 92-107 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
143. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 791. The Court reasoned that the practice is "deeply embedded in
the history and tradition" of the United States and is therefore permissible. 'Id. at 786.
144. Id. at 791. The Court did not examine the Nebraska legislature's practice under the
traditional Lemon test, but instead, either purposely ignored the test or carved out an exception
to it. Id. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 795-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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The opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly146 also illustrates the Court's
selective application of Lemon. Lynch involved the question of
whether a city could, within the limits of the Establishment Clause,
include a nativity scene in its annual Christmas display.147 Again
writing for the majority, Justice Brennan applied the Lemon test only
in form, 48 and concluded that the state practice satisfied the appro-
priate constitutional mandates.'49 The Lynch decision reflects the
Court's continued indifference to the demise of Lemon.150
Perhaps the greatest and most recent indication of the Court's
unwillingness to bring a level of consistency to its fragmented
Establishment Clause doctrine came in Board of Education of Kiryas
Joel Village School District v. Grumet.'51 In Grumet, the Court upheld
a New York Court of Appeals ruling which struck down as unconstitu-
tional a New York law creating a distinct and independent school
district for a community of Hasidic Jews. 15 2 In 1989, the New York
146. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
147. Id. at 671-72.
148. The majority opinion sheds light on the real motivation for upholding the Christmas
display and indicates that the Court was not guided by Lemon:
We are unable to perceive the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Bishop of Rome, or other
powerful religious leaders behind every public acknowledgment of the religious heritage
long officially recognized by the three constitutional branches of government. Any
notion that these symbols pose a real danger of establishment of a state church is
farfetched indeed.
Id. at 686. See also Gary J. Simson, The Establishment Clause in the Supreme Court:
Rethinking the Court's Approach, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 905, 906-07 (1987).
149. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 685.
150. Several Supreme Court opinions simply do not focus on the Establishment Clause test
set forth in Lemon. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993)
(upholding a government program providing a state-financed interpreter to a handicapped
student attending a Catholic school). Although the lower court found the law at issue
inconsistent with Lemon, the Court in Zobrest ignored the three-prong test entirely in favor of
basic "neutrality" rhetoric. Id. at 2466-69.
Similarly, in Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982), the Court refused to apply Lemon in
striking down a program which exempted certain religious organizations from compliance with
a state charity law. Although recognizing that analysis under Lemon would produce the same
result, the Court in Larson stated that "application of the Lemon tests is not necessary.. . ." Id.
at 252.
151. 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
152. Id. at 2494. The members of the Kiryas Joel community, a religious enclave of Satmar
Hasidim, practice a very strict form of Judaism that mandates separatism and avoidance of all
facets of the modem world. Writing for the Court, Justice Souter noted:
The residents of Kiryas Joel are vigorously religious people who make few
concessions to the modern world and go to great lengths to avoid assimilation into it.
They interpret the Torah strictly; segregate the sexes outside the home; speak Yiddish
as their primary language; eschew television, radio, and English-language publications;
and dress in distinctive ways....
Id. at 2485. The residents of the village of Kiryas Joel migrated to the Williamsburg section of
Brooklyn after the Holocaust of World War II drove them from much of Europe. See Joseph
Berger, Public School Leadership Fight Tearing a Hasidic Sect, N.Y. Times A15 (Jan. 3, 1994).
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Legislature created the Kiryas Joel Village School District153 in re-
sponse to pressure from members of the Hasidic community to pro-
vide for the special needs of its handicapped children.' M Various
partiesss challenged the law as an impermissible establishment of
religion under both the national and state constitutions.156 The trial
court found in favor of the plaintiffs on this issue,15' 7 and both the
The village was incorporated in 1977 and initially fell within the Monroe-Woodbury Central
School District until a special statute "carved out a separate district, following village lines, to
serve this distinctive population." Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2484.
153. The statute provides in full:
Section 1. The territory of the village of Kiryas Joel in the town of Monroe,
Orange county, on the date when this act shall take effect, shall be and hereby is
constituted a separate school district, and shall be known as the Kiryas Joel village
school district and shall have and eijoy all the powers and duties of a union free school
district under the provisions of the education law.
[Section] 2. Such district shall be under the control of a board of education, which
shall be composed of from five to nine members elected by the qualified voters of the
village of Kiryas Joel, said members to serve for terms not exceeding five years.
[Section] 3. This act shall take effect on the first day of July next succeeding the
date on which it shall have become a law.
Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2486 n.1 (quoting 1989 N.Y. Laws ch. 748).
154. Most of the children from the village attend private schools where they receive educa-
tion and training in compliance with the tenets of Satmar Hasidim. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2485.
Due to constrained budgets, these private schools do not offer any specialized services to handi-
capped children. Id. Under both state federal law, however, handicapped children within New
York are entitled to these services even if they are enrolled in private schools. Id. See also
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1988); N.Y. Educ. Law §§
4401-4449 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1994).
Initially, the Monroe-Woodbury Central School District provided the necessary handicapped
classes and services to those students within the community who required them. Grumet, 114
S. Ct. at 2485. These services ended in 1985, however, when the Supreme Court ruled that
public school teachers could not work in parochial schools. Id. (citingAguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S.
402 (1985) and School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985)). Consequently,
children of the village were forced to attend public schools located outside of the isolated village.
Several parents within the Kiryas Community, believing that contact with the outside world
was detrimental to the children's development, withdrew their children from the public schools,
and sought review of the public-school placements. Board of Educ. of Monroe-Woodbury Cent.
Sch. Dist. v. Wieder, 72 N.Y.2d 174, 527 N.E.2d 767, 770 (1988).
The governor of New York signed the Kiryas Joel Village School District bill into law in
1989 when only one child from the religious enclave was enrolled in the public school. Grumet,
114 S. Ct. at 2486. According to the governor, the 1989 law represented "a good faith effort to
solve th[e] unique problem" inherent in any attempt to provide the necessary services to
handicapped children within a religious community. Id.
155. The initial lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the law was brought by the
executive director and the president of the New York State School Boards Association, both in
their individual capacities and as officers of the association. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2486 n.2.
The New York Appellate Division ruled that neither the association nor its officers possessed
the requisite standing to challenge the law. Grumet, 187 A.D.2d 16, 592 N.Y.S.2d 123, 126
(1992). The Appellate Division also held, however, that the individual officers of the association
had statutory standing as citizen-taxpayers to bring the instant action. Id.
156. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2486.
157. Grumet v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 151 Misc. 2d 60, 579 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (Sup. Ct.
1992). According to the Supreme Court of Albany County, the statute which created the
independent school district violated all three prongs of the Lemon test. Id. at 1007-08. The
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Appellate Division 58 and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed. 15 9
The Supreme Court of the United States stayed the mandate of the
Court of Appeals 16 and granted certiorari.16'
A divided Supreme Court 62 affirmed the judgment of the New
York Court of Appeals on the ground that the law at issue impermis-
sibly advanced religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.163
What is interesting about the Grumet decision is not the final result,
but rather the Court's blatant refusal to apply the Lemon test in its
analysis. Although the decision does tangentially mention Lemon,
64
nowhere does the Court actually apply the three-prong inquiry to the
specific facts of the case.165 Instead, the Court based its decision on
the principle of state neutrality toward religion and concluded that
the New York statute violated this standard by delegating too much
authority to a religious organization.166 Not unlike Lamb's Chapel,
court therefore found the law unconstitutional under both the New York and United States
constitutions. Id. at 1007.
158. Grumet, 187 A.D.2d 16, 592 N.Y.S.2d 123 (1992). A divided Appellate Division af-
firmed the trial court's decision because it also found the New York law inconsistent with
Lemon. Id. at 126-28.
159. Grumet, 81 N.Y.2d 518, 618 N.E.2d 94 (1993). Two judges (Smith and Simmons, JJ.)
concluded that the New York law failed the Lemon test. Id. at 100 (concluding that "the princi-
pal or primary effect of [the New York law] is to advance religious beliefs"). Two other judges
concurred separately, one noting that the New York law was unconstitutional without regard to
Lemon, and the other stating that the law failed both the first and second prongs of Lemon. Id.
at 102 (Kaye, C.J., concurring) (rejecting the notion "that Lemon supplies the preferred
analytical framework for this case"); id. at 107 (Hancock, J., concurring) (noting that while
disposition of the case focused upon the "effect" prong of Lemon, the law also violated the first or
"purpose" prong). Finally, two judges joined in dissent, noting with approval the permissible
accommodation with religion that the law produced. Id. at 113 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting, in
which Titone, J., concurs).
160. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 10 (1993).
161. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 544 (1993).
162. There is perhaps no better evidence of the Court's confused and incoherent
Establishment Clause doctrine than the number of diverse and inconsistent opinions filed in the
Grumet case. Justice Souter announced the judgment of the Court. Justices Blackmun,
Stevens, O'Connor, and Kennedy filed separate concurring opinions, while Justice Scalia filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined.
163. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2494 (stating that the New York law crossed "the line from
permissible accommodation to impermissible establishment").
164. The Court in its analysis mentions Lemon only twice in the context of "see also" cites.
Id. at 2488. Such scant reference to the alleged test that controls all Establishment Clause
cases suggests that the Court has yet to accept responsibility for generating consistency in the
area of church-state interaction.
165. Although Justice Blackmun joined in concurrence to allay fears that the Court's
opinion signaled the demise of Lemon, one cannot argue that the Court actually supported the
principles outlined in that case. Id. at 2494-95 (noting that the cases upon which the Court
relied rested upon the Lemon criteria). Justice Blackmun's effort reflects more an attempt to
hold on to some semblance of stability in an area plagued with inconsistency rather than a
realistic portrait of the Court's analysis.
166. According to the Court, the proper inquiry was whether the New York law was neutral
toward religion. Id. at 2487. In striking down the law, the Court found that the New York
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the Court in Grumet failed to move beyond its preference for case-by-
case adjudication, choosing instead to decide only the narrow issue
before it.
At one time or another, almost every member of the Supreme
Court has voiced dissatisfaction with the Lemon test.16 7 The flood of
criticism, however, is not limited to the Court, as several
commentators also have attacked the test as fatally inadequate to
establish consistency in Establishment Clause decisions.168 The
principal challenge to the Lemon test is that it provides no more than
a general standard, or "helpful signpost '169 which the Court selectively
statute unconstitutionally delegated the state's authority over public schools to a group defined
by its religious character. Id. The Court found it unpersuasive that the law did not expressly
delegate power by reference to religious beliefs, concluding that the law "effectively identifies
these recipients of governmental authority by reference to doctrinal adherence, even though it
does not do so expressly." Id. at 2489. As Justice Souter noted:
In this case we are clearly constrained to conclude that the statute before us fails
the test of neutrality. It delegates a power this Court has said "ranks at the very apex of
the function of a State," to an electorate defined by common religious belief and practice,
in a manner that fails to foreclose religious favoritism.
Id. at 2494 (citation omitted).
167. Justice White dissented in Lemon and continued to express opposition over the appli-
cation of its framework. See, for example, Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768
(1976) (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating "I am no more reconciled now to Lemon...
than I was when it was decided"). Justice White's use of Lemon is primarily restricted to those
cases in which application of Lemon would result in upholding a challenged statute. See
Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987). Justice Rehnquist likewise
spoke out against Lemon. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 112 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 726 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (recognizing the Court's failure to apply consistently the Lemon test).
Justice O'Connor attacked the Lemon framework in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 429 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (expressing "doubts about [Lemon's] entanglement test"). Justice
Scalia robustly criticized the "purpose" prong of the test in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,
636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that "[a] pessimistic evaluation.., of the totality of
Lemon is particularly applicable to the 'purpose' prong"). Justice Kennedy also expressed
fervent dissatisfaction with the Lemon test in his dissent in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492
U.S. 573, 656 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(stating that "[s]ubstantial revision of our Establishment Clause doctrine may be in order').
168. See generally Paul Brickner, Comment, The Lemon Test and Subjective Intent in
Establishment Clause Analysis: The Case for Abandoning the Purpose Prong, 76 Ky. L. J. 1061
(1988); W. Scott Simpson, Comment, Lemon Reconstituted: Justice O'Connor's Proposed
Modifications of the Lemon Test for Establishment Clause Violations, 1986 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 465;
Phillip E. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72 Cal.
L. Rev. 817, 827-29 (1984); Carl H. Esbeck, The Lemon Test: Should It Be Retained, Reformed,
or Rejected?, 4 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Policy 513, 543 (1990) (stating that "[i]t is hard
to think of a contemporary legal doctrine that is as besieged from all quarters as is the Lemon
test ); Douglas Laycock, A Survey of Religious Liberty in the United States, 47 Ohio St. L. J. 409,
450 (1986); Kenneth W. Starr, The Establishment Clause, 41 Okla. L. Rev. 477 (1988); Hal
Culbertson, Note, Religion in the Political Process: A Critique of Lemon's Purpose Test, 1990 U.
Ill. L. Rev. 915; James M. Lewis and Michael L. Vild, Note, A Controversial Twist of Lemon."
The Endorsement Test as the New Establishment Clause Standard, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 671
(1990).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1939
has applied. In an effort to combat the widespread confusion and
criticism that surrounds current Establishment Clause analysis,
members of the Court have advocated significant revision or aban-
donment of the Lemon test.170
Throughout the 1980s, Justice O'Connor attempted to clarify
the Lemon framework by focusing upon the principle of state en-
dorsement of religion.Y7' According to O'Connor, the central focus of
Establishment Clause analysis is whether the governmental action
conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion.172 This
169. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973). As the Court explained in Lynch v.
Donnelly:
In each case, the inquiry calls for line-drawing; no fixed, per se rule can be framed. The
Establishment Clause like the Due Process Clause is not a precise, detailed provision in
a legal code capable of ready application. The purpose of the Establishment Clause "was
to state an objective, not to write a statute."
465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984) (quoting Walz v. Tax Commission., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
Though this construction of the Establishment Clause may be accurate, it provides only
context-specific guidance to government and state officials concerning what restrictions are
permissible and what restrictions are mandatory. This confusion is particularly acute in the
public school setting. In this forum, the Court has recognized that free speech and free exercise
remain applicable. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969). The Court has, however, also held that, due to the nature of schools and the interests to
be protected, religion may not be advanced. See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 584. As a result, there is
no definitive guideline to the scope and appropriate nature of government restraints on speech
or the exercise of religion. See Levin, 95 Yale L. J. at 1658-67 (cited in note 5).
170. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687.94 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting a new approach
to Establishment Clause cases); County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 655-56 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (stating that a revision of the Court's
Establishment Clause doctrine is needed).
171. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (asserting that the Lemon test
should require courts to consider whether government action has the purpose or effect of
endorsing religion); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69-70 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (framing the Lemon
inquiry as "whether government's purpose is to endorse religion and whether the statute
actually conveys a message of endorsement"); Corporation of Presiding Bishop, 483 U.S. at 346-
49 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (expanding on the endorsement analysis); County
of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 625 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (framing the issue as whether the
challenged government action conveys "an endorsement of particular religious beliefs").
Justice O'Connor's alternative Establishment Clause paradigm was constructed "in order to
make [the Lemon criteria] more useful in achieving the underlying purpose of the First
Amendment." Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring). According to Justice
O'Connor, any Establishment Clause construct must be designed to "prohibit[ I government
from making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political
community." Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice O'Connor's test has been subject to critical evaluation by several commentators.
See, for example, Donald L. Beschle, The Conservative as Liberal: The Religion Clauses, Liberal
Neutrality, and the Approach of Justice O'Connor, 62 Notre Dame L. Rev. 151, 175-82 (1987);
Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and
the '2Vo Endorsement" Test, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 266, 302-13 (1987); Note, Developments in the
Law-Religion and the State, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1606, 1647 (1987) (noting that Justice O'Connor
reformulated Lemon to focus on whether or not the government endorses religion).
172. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690-91
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
1968
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is an objective determination, and thus, the government's actual in-
tent is not controlling.173 Other members of the Court appear to have
accepted and applied Justice O'Connor's endorsement test in later
cases.174 This approach, however, does not eliminate the confusion
surrounding church-state issues because it depends on a case-by-case
evaluation of unique facts and circumstances. 175 Thus, while the en-
dorsement model serves to increase flexibility, it does not provide a
coherent framework for Establishment Clause issues.176
In County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 77 Justice Kennedy advanced
what has become known as the "coercion" test. 78 Kennedy strongly
criticized O'Connor's endorsement framework, 179 and reasoned that
the proper inquiry in Establishment Clause cases is whether the
government actually forces individuals to accept or participate in
173. Justice O'Connor summarized the endorsement test in County of Allegheny v. ACLU:
'The question under endorsement analysis, in short, is whether a reasonable observer would
view [the governmental action] as a disapproval of his or her particular religious choices...."
492 U.S. at 631 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
See also Wallace, 472 U.S. at 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that "It~he relevant issue
is whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementa-
tion of the statute, would perceive it as state endorsement"). One realistically could question
whether, given the high level of knowledge Justice O'Connor imputes to the objective observer,
the real focus is on the justices themselves.
174. See, for example, Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 8 (1989) (Brennan, J.) (stating
that "the Constitution prohibits, at the very least, legislation that constitutes an endorsement of
one or another set of religious beliefs or of religion generally); School Dist. of Grand Rapids v.
Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389 (1985) (Brennan, J.) (stating that "if this identification conveys a
message of governmental endorsement or disapproval of religion, a core purpose of the
Establishment Clause is violated"); County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592-94 (Brennan, J.). See
also Wallace, 472 U.S. at 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (framing the Establishment Clause
inquiry as "a legal question to be answered on the bases of judicial interpretation of social
facts").
175. County ofAllegheny, 492 U.S. at 606 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
176. Id.
177. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
178. Id. at 659-61 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
179. According to Justice Kennedy, Justice O'Connor's reformation of Lemon was "a...
most unwelcome... addition to our tangled Establishment Clause jurisprudence." Id. at 668.
Justice Kennedy believed that the "endorsement test" was inappropriate:
Either the endorsement test must invalidate scores of traditional practices recognizing
the place religion holds in our culture, or it must be twisted and stretched to avoid
inconsistency with practices we know to have been permitted in the past, while
condemning similar practices with no greater endorsement effect simply by reason of
their lack of historical antecedent.
Id. at 674.
Justice Kennedy believed that since O'Connor's proposed modification to the Lemon test was
not adopted by the Court in Lynch, it was not controlling, as it is unprecedented "that a concur-
ring opinion ... could take precedence over an opinion joined in its entirety by five Members of
the Court." Id. at 668. In reality, Justice O'Connor's model was adopted by the four dissenting
members in Lynch, and Justice Brennan, in writing for this group, observed that Justice
O'Connor had correctly stated the proper inquiry. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 697-98 n.3 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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religious practices which counter personally held beliefs. 18 According
to Kennedy, this approach would provide the appropriate balance
between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.181
Any other construct, according to Kennedy, would lead to the invali-
dation of accepted government actions, because all laws touching
upon religion in some way necessarily involve a degree of coercion.182
Kennedy suggested, however, that psychological coercion, short of
actual coercion, would also violate the Establishment Clause.'83
Although not carrying a majority of the Court, Justice
Kennedy did manage to gather the support of Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Scalia and White. 84 The Court repeatedly has recog-
nized, however, that a violation of the Establishment Clause need not
be predicated on any form of coercion. 85 Nevertheless, the increasing
debate between the "coercion" model and the "endorsement" test
indicates that, for the Court, the question of establishment is far from
resolved.
Lee v. Weisman 86 reflects the Court's confusion regarding the
applicability of Lemon and its alternative constructs. In Weisman,
the Court struck down as unconstitutional a public school policy that
permitted clergy members to give invocations and benedictions at
graduation ceremonies. 8 7 Although rejecting the school committee's
invitation to reconsider Lemon, 8 8 Justice Kennedy, writing for the
180. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 662 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part) (reasoning that "[a]bsent coercion, the risk of infringement of religious
liberty by passive or symbolic accommodation is minimal').
181. Id. at 661.
182. Id. at 659 (stating that "it would be difficult indeed to establish a religion without
some measure of more or less subtle coercion").
183. Id. at 661 (suggesting that "[slymbolic recognition or accommodation of religious faith
may violate the [Establishment] Clause in an extreme case").
184. Id. at 655.
185. See, for example, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) (recognizing that "[t]he
Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of
direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an
official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not);
Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1963) (holding that a violation of the
Establishment Clause need not be "predicated on coercion'); Committee for Pub. Educ. v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 786 (1973) (stating that "proof of coercion" is not "a necessary element of
any claim under the Establishment Clause); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 72 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2664 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (noting that "proof of government coercion is not necessary to prove an
Establishment Clause violation"); id. at 2672 (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that the Court's
precedents "simply cannot... support the position that a showing of coercion is necessary to a
successful Establishment Clause claim").
186. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
187. Id. at 2661.
188. Id. at 2655 (declining "the invitation of [the school committee] and amicus the United
States to reconsider [the Court's] decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman").
1970
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Court, appled the coercion test from the County of Allegheny
dissent.18 9
It is apparent from the Court's decision in Lamb's Chapel v.
Center Moriches Union Free School District that Lemon is still the
operative Establishment Clause paradigm. What Weisman
illustrates, however, is that as late as 1992, the continued debate over
Lemon had not been resolved. In Lamb's Chapel, the Supreme Court
failed to capitalize on an opportunity to resolve this debate.
D. The Right of Free Speech
The First Amendment, in addition to ensuring personal auton-
omy in religious affairs, also guarantees freedom of speech and
expression.190 The protection of speech is not limited to the spoken
word, but also may encompass physical and expressive conauct.19
Not all speech falls within the scope of the First Amendment,192
however, and even speech which is entitled to protection may be
189. Justice Kennedy stated in Lee v. Weisman that "[it is beyond dispute that, at a
minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or
participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which 'establishes a [state]
religion or religious faith, or tends to do so."' 112 S. Ct. at 2655 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678)
(emphasis added).
Continuing, Kennedy concluded that this interpretation of the Establishment Clause was
sufficient to decide the instant case, reasoning that "[the State's involvement in the school
prayers challenged today violates these central principles." Id. Since Weisman, scholars have
debated whether or not this decision effectively eliminated Lemon as the core Establishment
Clause paradigm. See Paulsen, 43 Case W. Res. L. Rev. at 795 (cited in note 134); Conkle, 43
Case W. Res. L. Rev. at 865 (cited in note 136).
190. U.S. Const., Amend. I provides in part: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom of speech."
191. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (holding that burning the American
flag is expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment); United States v. Eichman, 496
U.S. 310 (1990) (upholding the Johnson determination that flag burning constitutes expressive
conduct); United States v. O Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (noting that burning a Selective
Service registration certificate may be sufficient to bring First Amendment protection into play);
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-11 (1974) (holding that displaying an altered flag may
constitute conduct protected by the First and Fourth amendments).
192. The Supreme Court has, on several occasions, held that certain forms of expression,
though formally "speech," are not entitled to protection under the First Amendment. Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding obscenity not entitled to protection) (later
defined in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52
(1919) (holding that the advocacy of illegal conduct is not considered "speech" for purposes of
First Amendment). This holding was limited in the later case of Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 447 (1969) (stating that government cannot regulate speech that advocates illegal conduct
"except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action"); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942)
(denying First Amendment protection to speech classified as "fighting words"); New York Times
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (excluding defamation from First Amendment protec-
tion); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (same).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1939
regulated under certain circumstances. 193 In determining whether
restrictions on speech are valid, courts will consider the nature of the
restriction and the location in which the speech occurs.
194
Governmental restrictions on speech can be classified as con-
tent-based or content-neutral. 195 Under the former category, the gov-
ernment takes action which restricts otherwise protected speech
solely on the basis of its subject matter or underlying viewpoint.196
The case of Cohen v. California97 illustrates the basic idea of content-
based restrictions. In Cohen, the defendant was convicted of
disturbing the peace for wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the
Draft" in a public place. 198 In reversing the conviction, the Court held
that although the state had a legitimate interest in maintaining order
in public places, it could not legitimately advance that interest by
punishing speech solely on the basis of its underlying content. 99 The
Court has long held that content-based restrictions on speech are
presumptively unconstitutional200 and cannot be upheld absent proof
of a compelling state interest and a showing that the restriction is
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.20'
The second type of governmental restriction impedes the free
flow of ideas without reference to the content of the underlying
speech.202 Restrictions of this type are considered content-neutral
and, in certain circumstances, will be upheld as reasonable time,
193. The right of free speech, though phrased in absolute language, is not absolute and un-
limited. General regulatory statutes, not intended to inhibit the exercise of free speech but
incidentally limiting its unfettered exercise, are constitutionally valid, provided that they are
supported by sufficient governmental interests. See, for example, Konigsberg v. State Bar of
California, 366 U.S. 36, 44 (1961) (holding that a state may deny admission to the Bar for
refusal to answer relevant questions in the application process); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S.
147, 160 (1939) (holding that a state may lawfully regulate the use of public streets even if
regulations incidentally interfere with the right of free speech); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S.
569, 575 (1941) (upholding convictions of Jehovah's Witnesses for marching in public street
without obtaining requisite permit as justified by the state's interest in ensuring safety of
citizens).
194. See Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-2 at 789, § 12-24 at 987 (cited in note 4).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
198. Id. at 16.
199. Id. at 18.
200. See, for example, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542 (1992); Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 508 (1991); Police
Dep't. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). See also Paul B. Stephen, The First
Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 Va. L. Rev. 203, 233-36 (1982) (discussing cases
based on content-neutral speech).
201. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
202. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-2 at 977-78 (cited in note 4).
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place, or manner regulations.23 Unlike content-based restrictions on
speech, these restrictions need not be justified by a compelling gov-
ernmental interest.
20 4
In addition to the nature of the restriction placed upon speech,
the location or "forum" in which the speech occurs also influences the
extent to which the government may regulate expression.2 5 Forum
analysis is a framework developed by the Supreme Court to
determine when the governmental interest in limiting the use of
government property "to its intended purpose outweighs the interest
of those wishing to use the property for other purposes.20 6 In effect,
this balancing approach seeks to delineate the permissible level of
governmental regulation of speech on publicly owned property. The
Court's forum analysis approach to First Amendment issues identifies
the nature and intended use of the government property, the interest
of the government in that property, and the standard that must be
applied in determining whether the government properly excluded a
particular speaker from that forum.20 7 Courts traditionally have
divided government property into three classifications: the
traditional public forum, the designated public forum and the
nonpublic forum.208
The traditional public forum includes government property
that historically has been open to public debate and assembly.
20 9
203. A government restriction on the use of National Parks in accordance with the pur-
poses for which they were established is an example of a content-neutral restriction on speech.
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984). To be upheld, such
restrictions must: (1) be justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech; (2) be
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest; and (3) leave open ample alter-
native channels for communication of the restricted information. See City Council of Los
Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 805 (1984) (holding that a city has the constitu-
tional power to restrict sign-posting in order to improve the city's appearance); United States v.
Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (stating that a prohibition on expression must be narrowly
drawn to accomplish a compelling governmental interest); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104, 121 (1972) (upholding the validity of a law which prohibited demonstrations near schools
during instructional time).
204. See Clark, 468 U.S. at 295. When governmental restrictions are not aimed at ideas or
the free flow of information, the Court traditionally has balanced the severity of the restriction
against the state's asserted interest. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 51
(1961); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941).
205. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985).
206. Id. at 800. This approach toward free speech analysis has produced critical
commentary. See, for example, David S. Day, The End of the Public Forum Doctrine, 78 Iowa
L. Rev. 143, 145, 202 (1992); Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The
History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1713, 1715 (1987).
207. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800 (stating that "the extent to which the Government can
control access [to a particular forum] depends on the nature of the relevant forum").
208. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
209. Id. at 45 (designating public fora as those "places which by long tradition or by gov-
ernment fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate). The Court has recognized the
197319941
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Classic examples of such fora are public streets and parks.210 The
government's ability to enforce content-based restrictions in these
areas is confined to situations in which the regulation serves a com-
pelling government interest and the restriction is narrowly drawn to
achieve that interest.211 Content-neutral restrictions in traditional
public fora will be upheld if they are narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest and leave open alternative channels
for communication. 21
2
Designated public fora, though similar to traditional public
fora, consist of government property which historically has not been
open to public assembly or debate but which the government has
opened for public use.213 Examples of designated public fora include
university facilities made available for student meetings, 2 4 municipal
theaters,2 5 and school board meetings opened for citizen input.2 6
Although the government is not required to maintain designated
public fora,217 as long as it does so, it is bound by the same standards
that govern the traditional public fora.218
Finally, nonpublic government property is that which by
tradition or designation is not a forum designed for public
communication.219 In these nonpublic fora, government regulations
need only be reasonable in light of the facility's intended purpose and
not operate to restrict speech on the basis of its underlying content.220
defining characteristic of the traditional public forum as property that has as a "principal pur-
pose.., the free exchange of ideas." Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800.
210. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. See also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988)
(confirming the notion that residential streets constitute public fora).
211. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)). Failure to
meet this stringent requirement results in the government being forced to grant access to the
excluded party. Carey, 447 U.S. at 464-67. The Court in Perry also recognized that the
government "may not prohibit all communicative activity" within the traditional public forum.
Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
212. See note 203 and accompanying text.
213. See International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2705
(1992). The government must take some affirmative action to create a designated public forum.
Id. at 2706. This is done only when the government intentionally opens "a nontraditional forum
for public discourse." Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
214. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981).
215. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975).
216. Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167,
175 (1976).
217. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
218. Id.
219. Id. Examples of nonpublic fora include prisons and city transit systems. See Jones v.
North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 134 (1977); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S.
39,46 (1966); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-04 (1974).
220. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (holding that restrictions on access to nonpublic fora will be
upheld if they are "reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public
officials oppose the speaker's view"). See also Lehman, 418 U.S. at 303. Generally, the
1974
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The Court has suggested that a fourth type of forum should be
recognized, the limited public forum.221  In these fora, a designated
public facility is opened for use by a certain class of speakers or for
assembly and debate on selected subjects. 22 2 Some have argued that
in these situations, government property remains nonpublic as to all
unspecified uses.
223
Designating public schools as one type of forum or another
obviously affects the degree of scrutiny that restrictions on speech
must pass to be found constitutional.224 Public school facilities become
designated public fora when school officials open those facilities for
indiscriminate use by the general public. 225  When school officials
permit public access to school facilities for certain specified uses,
however, the question becomes whether the uses are indiscriminate or
merely characteristic of a limited public forum.2 6  It appears that
selective access to school facilities does not create a public forum in
government restriction need not be the most or the only reasonable limitation available. See
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 808; Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2708; United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720,
730 (1990).
221. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7 (suggesting "[a] public forum may be created for a limited
purpose such as use by certain groups, or for discussion of certain subjects") (citations omitted);
Travis v. Owego-Appalachian Sch. Dist., 927 F.2d 688, 692 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding that a limited
public forum "is created when government opens a nonpublic forum but limits the expressive
activity to certain kinds of speakers or to the discussion of certain subjects').
222. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7.
223. Lamb's Chapel, 959 F.2d at 386.
224. See text accompanying notes 205-08.
225. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988) (citation omitted).
226. There is authority for both of these conclusions. Federal courts of appeals have held
that school facilities made available for social, civic, and recreational use by outside groups are
designated public fora. See, for example, Grace Bible Fellowship, Inc. v. Maine Sch. Admin.
Dist. #5, 941 F.2d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that the school district created a public forum
and thus could not exclude religious organizations from using it); National Socialist White
People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010, 1018 (4th Cir. 1973) (en banc) (stating that a school
auditorium used regularly for the exercise of free speech was a public forum); Knights of the Ku
Klux Klan v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 578 F.2d 1122, 1124 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding
that past grants of permission to use a school facility made it a public forum). The Supreme
Court has suggested, however, that when property is opened for use by a selective class or for
speech on designated subjects, it is no longer a designated public forum, but rather a limited
public forum. In Perry, for example, the Court held that a school's internal mail system was a
nonpublic forum open for use to only a limited number of outside entities. The Court held that,
absent evidence that all who sought access were granted permission to use the school property,
"selective access does not transform government property into a public forum." Perry Educ.
Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 47. Similarly, in United States v. Kokinda, the Court held that a sidewalk on
federal property was a nonpublic forum even though some expressive activity had been
permitted there. It held that "[the government does not create a public forum by... permitting
limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse."
497 U.S. at 730 (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802) (emphasis added in Kokinda).
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which all interested entities have an unconditional right to utilize
school property.
27
Supreme Court cases that address the question of free speech
in public schools often focus on the rights of students to express vari-
ous social, religious, and political viewpoints. The Court has noted
that student expression is subject to First Amendment protection
even if it involves political or religious subjects.2 28 In order to bolster
the right of religious expression for students, Congress enacted the
Equal Access Act ("the Act").2 29 Generally, the Act makes it unlawful
for public secondary schools to deny students access to school facilities
because of the political or religious nature of their speech.230 The Act
does not, however, require public schools to allow nonstudent relig-
ious groups access to school property.
In Lamb's Chapel, both the district court and the Second
Circuit held that the district's refusal to allow Lamb's Chapel access
to school facilities did not constitute a violation of the Free Speech
227. See text accompanying note 226. See also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 805 (holding that a
combined federal campaign is a nonpublic forum providing limited access to "those organiza-
tions considered appropriate"); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981) (finding that uni-
versity facilities must be available to students only); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,
420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975) (holding that municipal facilities constituted a limited public forum
because they were restricted to dramatic productions).
228. See, for example, Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969) (finding the wearing of black armbands by students to protest Vietnam War is protected
as expressive conduct because students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of...
expression at the schoolhouse gate"); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 689 (1986)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (recognizing that "[tihe authority school officials have to regulate such
speech by high school students is not limitless). The Court has tempered this recognition with
the understanding that student rights cannot be universally equated with the rights of adults.
See Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 266 (recognizing that although rights are not "shed" at
the schoolhouse gate, students' rights are not automatically the same as the rights of adults in
other settings). The fact that student speech may contain religious references, however, in no
way curtails its First Amendment status. See, for example, Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269 (noting
that college students' religious speech is protected); Mergens v. Board of Educ. of Westside
Community Sch., 867 F.2d 1076, 1079 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that religious activity of public
secondary school students is protected).
229. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (1988).
230. The Act provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which receives Federal financial
assistance and which has a limited open forum to deny equal access or a fair opportunity
to, or discriminate against, any students who wish to conduct a meeting within that
limited open forum on the basis of the religious, political, philosophical, or other content
of the speech at such meetings.
Id. § 4071(a).
In order to fall within the mandate of the Act, secondary schools must: (1) be public and not
private; (2) receive financial assistance from the government; and (3) maintain a limited open
forum of noncurriculum related student groups. Id. § 4071 (a) & (b). Nowhere does the Act
require all public schools to open their facilities to religious-oriented school groups. Only when
the school has unilaterally opened its facilities for certain student groups is it required to do so.
1976
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Clause.2 1 The Second Circuit, relying on the nature of the govern-
ment property and the type of restriction imposed,23 2 concluded that
the total exclusion of religious groups from school property was within
the range of permissible restrictions.233 This f'mding, coupled with the
Establishment Clause and Free Exercise reasoning of the lower
courts, set the stage for the Supreme Court's holding.
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
A. The Opinion of the Court
In a majority opinion authored by Justice White,234 the
Supreme Court reversed the district court and Second Circuit deci-
sions.235 The Court held that the district's refusal to allow Lamb's
Chapel access to school property violated the Free Speech Clause of
the First Amendment.236 The Court noted that although the district
could protect school property under its control23 7 and was under no
obligation to grant access to outside groups, 238 it could not deny access
to Lamb's Chapel once it unilaterally had opened its facilities to a
variety of other organizations.2 9
The Court rejected the Second Circuit's conclusion that the
district's regulations were content-neutral since they were applied to
231. Lamb's Chapel, 770 F. Supp. at 97-98; 959 F.2d at 387-89.
232. Because the Second Circuit found that religious groups had been excluded from school
property in the past, it declined the plaintiffs' invitation to label the district's facilities desig-
nated public fora. Instead, the Second Circuit concluded that the school property was a limited
public forum. The court held that, consistent with Perry, the school could therefore exclude
entire groups from its property, provided that the exclusion did not rest upon the content of the
message conveyed. The school property could thus remain nonpublic with respect to those
activities specifically excluded by state regulations, namely, religious uses. The fact that the
district had allowed other nonreligious groups access did not transform the limited nature of
school facilities into a public forum. Lamb's Chapel, 959 F.2d at 387-88.
233. Id.
234. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, and Souter joined.
235. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2149.
236. Id. at 2147-48.
237. Id. at 2146 (stating "It~here is no question that the District, like the private owner of
property, may legally preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is dedi-
cated!). The Court has recognized that the government is under no obligation to allow all forms
of speech on property that it owns and controls. See, for example, International Society for
Krishna Consciousness, 112 S. Ct. at 2705; United States Postal Service v. Council of
Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976).
238. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2146.
239. Id. The Court relied on the district court findings concerning what organizations had
been granted access to school facilities. Id. at 2146 n.5.
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restrict access to all religious organizations.240 The Court framed the
critical issue as whether the district restrictions were applied to
prevent Lamb's Chapel from using school facilities because of the
viewpoint of the speech involved, not whether all religious organiza-
tions similarly were denied access. 241 The Court went on to note that
because the district regulations would have allowed presentation of
the film involved in the instant case had it not dealt with the subject
matter from a religious standpoint, Lamb's Chapel was denied access
because of the film's underlying content.
242
While acknowledging that religious involvement in public
schools may create a compelling interest,243 the Court summarily
rejected the district's contention that granting access to Lamb's
Chapel would amount to an establishment of religion.2" First, the
Court appeared to apply an endorsement test in finding no danger
that the community would perceive state support of particular relig-
ious views by allowing Lamb's Chapel access to school facilities.245
The Court went on, however, to apply the much maligned Lemon
test.246 It held that permitting Lamb's Chapel to use district property
to exhibit the film involved in the instant case did not violate the
Lemon standard.
247
The Court found no merit in the district's position that since
there was no guarantee that Lamb's Chapel's application would have
been granted absent its religious affiliation, it should not reverse the
240. Id. at 2147.
241. According to the Court, the fact "[tlhat all religions and all uses for religious purposes
are treated alike under [the district restriction], however, does not answer the critical question
whether it discriminates on the basis of viewpoint...." Id.
242. The Court noted that the general topic of child rearing and family values was not pro-
hibited by the district restriction. Id. The only reason the film series was denied, according to
the Court, was because it dealt with the subject matter from a religious standpoint. Id.
Accordingly, the Court found the distict's restriction "plainly invalid." Id.
243. The Court stated: "[The interest of the State in avoiding an Establishment Clause
violation 'may be [a] compelling' one justifying an abridgment of free speech otherwise protected
by the First Amendment ... " Id. at 2148 (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271
(1981)).
244. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2148 (stating "the posited fears [of the district] of an
Establishment Clause violation are unfounded'.
245. The Court concluded that since the film would not have been shown during school
hours, would not have been sponsored by the school, and would have been open to the public,
"there would have been no realistic danger that the community would think that the District
was endorsing religion or any particular creed, and any benefit to religion or to the Church
would have been no more than incidental." Id.
246. Id. The Court unequivocally stated that the Lemon test had "not been overruled'
According to the Court, the instant case did not even present an occasion to rethink Lemon or
its framework. Id. at 2148 n.7.
247. Id. at 2148.
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lower courts. 248 The Court found this inquiry irrelevant given the
content-based nature of the underlying restriction.249 Moreover, since
the district had chosen to allow a variety of organizations to use
school property, there was no realistic concern that allowing access to
Lamb's Chapel would promote sectarian interests over the interests of
the citizenry in general.250
B. The Kennedy Concurrence
In a rather short concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy joined in
the judgment of the Court.251 Justice Kennedy based his holding on
two different grounds. First, he agreed that the district restriction
was an "overt, viewpoint-based discrimination" that violated the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment.252 Second, Justice Kennedy
believed that there was no showing of an Establishment Clause
violation that could warrant sustaining the exclusion of Lamb's
Chapel in the instant case.253
Interestingly, Justice Kennedy blatantly criticized the
majority's establishment reasoning. According to Justice Kennedy,
the Court's use of the Lemon test was misplaced.254 Similarly, Justice
Kennedy voiced his disapproval of the Court's use of Justice
O'Connor's endorsement language.255 Justice Kennedy believed that
this test was inconsistent with the previous decisions of the Court and
served only to confuse the proper inquiry in the instant case.256
C. The Scalia Concurrence
Justice Scalia, while concurring in the result, wrote separately
to note his ardent disapproval of the Court's Establishment Clause
248. The Court found this inquiry to be "beside the point," focusing instead on the content-
based nature of the underlying restriction. Id. at 2149.
249. Id.
250. The district attempted to justify its exclusion of Lamb's Chapel on the ground that it
was necessary to promote the interests of the general public, rather than a specific group or
religious organization. The Court, however, held that since a variety of other groups had
utilized the facilities for social, civic, and educational purposes, allowing access to Lamb's
Chapel would not hinder the interests of the public. Id. at 2148-49.
251. Id. at 2149 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. (reasoning that since there was no Establishment Clause concern, the "Court's
citation of Lemon v. Kurtzman .. .is unsettling and unnecessary).
255. Id.
256. Id. Justice Kennedy believed that the endorsement test "cannot suffice as a rule of
decision consistent with our precedents and our traditions in this part of our jurisprudence." Id.
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analysis.257 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, initially noted
his agreement with the Court's two main conclusions: (1) the
district's refusal to allow Lamb's Chapel to show its films, while
generally. opening its facilities to the public, violated the Free Speech
Clause; and (2) allowing Lamb's Chapel to use school facilities would
not violate the Establishment Clause.
258
Justice Scalia expressed disbelief over the Court's mention of
the Lemon test.259 He noted that no fewer than five of the current
Justices had personally criticized Lemon over the years. 260 Justice
Scalia then went on to attack Lemon directly. He suggested that the
framework which it provided was really no test at all,261 but merely a
guideline, kept alive by the Court for selective application when it
served the Court's interests.262 According to Justice Scalia, the Court
used Lemon to strike down practices with which it disapproved, or
ignored it entirely in other situations.263 Scalia then went on to note
that he would not apply Lemon in the future, regardless of its effect.
264
257. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
258. Id.
259. In an elaborate passage, Justice Scalia strongly criticized the majority for its reference
to Lemon:
Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and
shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our
Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and
school attorneys of Center Moriches Union Free School District. It's most recent burial,
only last Term, was, to be sure, not fully six-feet under: our decision in Lee v. Wdsran...
conspicuously avoided using the supposed "test" but also declined the invitation to
repudiate it.
Id. at 2149-50.
260. Justice Scalia noted that "[o]ver the years, however, no fewer than five of the currently
sitting Justices have, in their own opinions, personally driven pencils through the creature's
[the Lemon test's] heart.... ." Id. at 2150. See also note 11.
261. Justice Scalia referred to Lemon as the "supposed 'test"' which the Court ignored in
application, yet failed to eliminate. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2150.
262. Justice Scalia expressed his disgust at the Court's selective application of Lemon.
After noting that a majority of the justices personally had called for the demise of Lemon,
Justice Scalia then explained why, despite this flood of criticism, the Court continued to apply
its three-prong test. According to Justice Scalia, "[tihe secret of the Lemon test's survival, I
think, is that it is so easy to kill. It is there to scare us (and our audience) when we wish it to do
so, but we can command it to return to the tomb at will." He continued, "such a docile and
useful monster is worth keeping around, at least in a somnolent state; one never knows when
one might need him." Id.
263. In an accurate portrayal of Establishment Clause precedent, Justice Scalia noted that
the Court selectively applies Lemon as a tool to achieve desired results in certain cases, and not
as a cohesive and uniform test in all cases. Referring to the Lemon test, Justice Scalia noted:
"When we wish to strike down a practice it forbids, we invoke it; when we wish to uphold a
practice it forbids, we ignore it entirely. Sometimes we take a middle course, calling its three




Justice Scalia explained that he could not join the Court's
decision, not only because it used Lemon, but also because it used the
endorsement test.265 He rejected the idea that the Constitution
forbids endorsement of religion in general since the Free Exercise
Clause grants religion a preferred status.2 6 Justice Scalia reasoned
that far from prohibiting accommodation of religion, the Constitution
demands it,267 a conclusion that, according to Justice Scalia, is
supported by the Founders268 and the Court.269
V. COMMENT AND ANALYSIS
Characteristic of the Supreme Court's fragmented
Establishment Clause doctrine and preference for case-by-case
adjudication, the central holding of Lamb's Chapel, though precise
and uncontroversial, is rather limited in both scope and significance:
The First Amendment generally prohibits viewpoint discrimination by
the government.270 Since the school district in the instant case would
have allowed any social, civic, or recreational group to present its
views on family issues, it was unconstitutional to prohibit a religious
group from doing so.271 In reality, however, Lamb's Chapel is unlikely
to provide any precedential value beyond the unique facts involved in
that case. The significance of Lamb's Chapel lies more in the
unanswered questions and heightened confusion it produces. While
applauded by different organizations on opposite ends of the church-
265. Id. at 2151.
266. Id. (observing "[w]hat a strange notion, that a Constitution which itself gives 'religion
in general' preferential treatment... forbids endorsement of religion in general") (emphasis in
original).
267: Id.
268. Id. (concluding that to refuse religion a place in society was "not the view of those who
adopted our Constitution, who believed that the public virtues inculcated by religion are a
public good"). Justice Scalia went on to note that when the First Amendment was drafted,
Congress enacted the Northwest Territory Ordinance of 1789, which provides: "Religion,
morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind,
schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged." Id. (citation omitted,
emphasis added by Justice Scalia).
269. Justice Scalia noted several Supreme Court cases standing for the proposition that
indifference to religion is neither what the First Amendment demands nor permits. In contrast,
Scalia noted that in some instances, government action will advance religion in ways consistent
with the Establishment Clause. Id.
270. The Court in Lamb's Chapel, though considering Establishment Clause implications,
decided the case on free speech grounds. Id. at 2147-48.
271. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2147.
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state debate, 272 the instant case raises some fundamental questions
that are left unresolved.
Unfortunately, Lamb's Chapel failed to articulate a cohesive
framework for the resolution of church-state interaction. The most
disturbing aspect of the Court's opinion is its application of two en-
tirely different models of Establishment Clause analysis. Although
the endorsement test had never been accepted by a majority of the
Justices,273 the Court applied this framework in the instant case to
invalidate a total ban on religious access to school facilities.
274
Application of the endorsement test alone would have failed to
eliminate Establishment Clause confusion, but the Court also applied
the much-maligned Lemon test.275 As a result, Lamb's Chapel
actually heightened the level of confusion and inconsistency
surrounding the continuing Establishment Clause debate by applying
two distinct and independent tests simultaneously. At best, the
instant case forces everyone, including public school districts, to
ascertain from a multitude of tests what actions violate the
Establishment Clause.
Justice Scalia adds to this confusion in his dramatic concur-
rence by proposing what appears to be yet another alternative to
Lemon. According to Justice Scalia, only government action that
signifies state acceptance of a particular religious ideology violates
the Establishment Clause.276  Under this "religious embrace" test,
schools presumably could endorse, support, or advocate religion in
general, but could not support any particular religion or religious
ideology.277 Under this framework, school policies would not run afoul
272. Pat Robertson's American Center for Law and Justice, a very conservative organiza-
tion, was joined in the instant case by Americans United for Separation of Church and State
and the American Civil Liberties Union, both of which filed briefs supporting Lamb's Chapel's
right of free speech. David Schimmel, Discrimination Against Religious Viewpoints Prohibited
in Public Schools, 85 Educ. L. Rptr. 387, 392 (1993).
273. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 668 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
274. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2148.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 2151 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that "giving Lamb's Chapel
nondiscriminatory access to school facilities cannot violate [the Establishment Clause] because
it does not signify state or local embrace of a particular religious sect").
277. This conclusion is supported by Justice Scalia's concurrence. Justice Scalia
emphatically argues that the government may advance religion in general in order to follow
precedent and tradition. Id. (citing several cases standing for the proposition that the
Establishment Clause does not prevent indifference to religion, but rather requires
advancement in certain situations). In the last sentence of the concurrence, moreover, Justice
Scalia found that granting access to Lamb's Chapel would not violate the Establishment Clause




of the Establishment Clause even if their purpose or ultimate effect
was to advance religion.278 This approach, however, fails to follow the
direct language and underlying spirit of the Establishment Clause
because it permits government involvement in religious affairs to an
extent inconsistent with judicial precedent.279
Due to the Court's failure in Lamb's Chapel to generate
consistency in Establishment Clause analysis, the case fails to
delineate a proper limit on religious access to school facilities.
Although Lamb's Chapel stands for the proposition that religious
groups are entitled to equal access to school facilities once school
districts permit after-hours use of their property,280 it does not
indicate what religious activities would exceed permissible bounds.
If, as the Court suggests, a school district must allow religious groups
to present a religious perspective on a general and clearly secular
topic, such as family values and child rearing, must it also allow these
groups to use schools for admittedly religious purposes, such as
peyote rituals, animal sacrifice, or Sunday Mass? According to the
Lamb's Chapel analysis, excluding these practices on school property
would be content-based and thus unconstitutional. Although it is
difficult to imagine the Court upholding these activities, nothing in
the instant case suggests that religious access does not include
unqualified religious use.
By interpreting content-based restrictions in a broad fashion,
the instant decision virtually eliminates the viability of limited public
fora. The Court in Lamb's Chapel recognized that access to nonpublic
fora can be based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as
the distinctions drawn are viewpoint neutral.28' When the govern-
278. Id.
279. The Author does not agree that the Establishment Clause permits the government to
"establish religion" provided all ideologies are advanced uniformity. Justice Scalia's
concurrence, in accepting just such an analysis, effectively turns the Establishment Clause on
its head by arguing that while it is improper to advance some religion, it is appropriate to
advance all religion.
The Establishment Clause was intended to prevent government involvement in religion,
regardless of whether the actions taken by the state fail to show preferential treatment to one
sect or support for another. At a minimum, the Establishment Clause was enacted to prohibit
"sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious affairs."
Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). A policy supporting all religions, even with
no "embrace of a particular sect," still contravenes this standard. As Justice Black noted, "a
state policy of aiding 'all religions' necessarily requires a governmental decision as to what
constitutes 'a religion.' Thus is created a governmental power to hinder certain religious beliefs
by denying their character as such." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 318 n.4 (1952) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
280. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2147-48.




ment denies access in order to suppress views espoused on an
"otherwise includible subject," it violates this standard. 82
In the instant case, the film series allegedly addressed family
interaction.283 The true subject matter of the film, however, was the
role of Christianity within the family unit.284 Contrary to the Court's
finding that this subject was otherwise permissible under the district
regulations, the district's policy expressly excluded religious
subjects.2 5 In effect, the Court, while paying lip service to the
propriety of exclusions in limited public fora, held that restrictions on
access can never be applied to exclude religious groups from school
property because, by definition, these restrictions would be content-
based.
The instant case, moreover, may have the unintended effect of
stifling the exercise of free speech, rather than endorsing and encour-
aging it. By effectively eliminating schools' ability to open their facili-
ties on a limited basis-for a selected class of speakers or for discus-
sion of selected topics-Lamb's Chapel may actually foster a closed-
door policy by public schools. Instead of creating high profile
controversy every time a religious group or fringe political
organization seeks access to school facilities, public school districts
may decide to exclude all groups, regardless of political or religious
affiliation. This result would be understandable in light of Lamb's
Chapel, which effectively forces school districts to allow all speech on
school property if they unilaterally have opened their doors to the
community in general for apolitical gatherings. This all or nothing
approach does not advance the First Amendment goal of free and
uninhibited discussion; it hinders it.
The risk of a closed-door effect is heightened by the language of
the instant case. The practical message sent by the Court is clear and
straightforward: deny access to everyone. First, as the Court noted,
public schools may preserve property under their control and need not
282. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2147.
283. The Court's acceptance of the nonreligious subject of the film series is evident by the
manner in which the Court framed the issue: "[Whether [the District restriction] discriminates
on the basis of viewpoint to permit school property to be used for the presentation of all views
about family issues and child-rearing except those dealing with the subject matter from a
religious standpoint." Id.
The Court effectively separated the basic subject of the film from the manner in which it
was presented. This distinction led to the conclusion that Lamb's Chapel would have allowed
any "social, civic, or recreational" group to show a film on the same subject. The Court rejected
the position of the district that all groups addressing family values from a religious standpoint
were similarly excluded. Id.




permit the after-hours use of their facilities by any outside group.286
Second, it is clear that if a school district permits some groups to use
its property, it must grant the same access to all groups. When the
Court holds that avoidance of an Establishment Clause violation may
constitute a compelling interest,27 yet fails to provide guidance on
exactly what constitutes the violation,288 it is unreasonable to expect
public schools to determine what the Court itself has failed to
determine: What constitutes an Establishment Clause violation?
VI. CONCLUSION
Lamb's Chapel not only failed to resolve the confusion sur-
rounding the Establishment Clause, but increased it by adding to the
number of alleged tests to be used in Establishment Clause analysis.
Moreover, the instant case, though decided on free speech grounds,
created the very real possibility that public school districts will close
their doors to all outside entities, a result that can only decrease the
exercise of First Amendment rights.
Given the unique nature of public schools, the scope and extent
of religious involvement within these areas must be limited consider-
ably. Unfortunately, the Court has eroded piecemeal the idea that
church and state must remain distinct. Instead, the Court has
allowed religion to make inroads into public schools to an extent
inconsistent with the Establishment Clause.
The debate and controversy within the Court will continue
unabated unless a single Establishment Clause standard is devel-
oped. Without this standard, school districts and other government
entities are forced to predict the Court's future approach to church-
state issues prior to enacting reasonable restrictions on religious
access. This result does not assist the goal of freedom, but prevents
its realization.
Any attempt to bring a level of consistency and predictability
to the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence must
begin with an understanding that at the present time, there simply is
no single "test." While several competing constructs for the resolution
of church-state interaction do exist, the members of the Court have
yet to reach a consensus on an appropriate framework. The Court's
continued reluctance to formally abrogate the Lemon test and replace
286. Id. at 2146.
287. Id. at 2148.
288. See notes 245-47.
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it with one of several available alternatives renders an effective solu-
tion to this troubling situation improbable. A constant and ever-
evolving middle ground, with passing references to Lemon and unpre-
dictable applications of several different approaches, serves only to
muddle the already confusing body of law surrounding the Religion
Clauses.
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